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Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine
CATHARINE PIERCE WELLS†
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses two distinct issues. The first
relates to C.C. Langdell, his invention of legal doctrine, and
his enduring contribution to American law. The second
relates to legal doctrine generally, seeking a more precise
understanding of what it is, where it comes from, and the
role it plays in deciding legal cases.
There are a number of reasons why Langdell remains
an important figure in American law. First, he originated
the case method as a means of legal education;1 second, he
initiated and inspired the effort to formulate classical
contract theory;2 and third, he represents to modern readers
a symbol of legal formalism.3 Indeed, it is this last fact that
† Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1968 Wellesley College;
M.A. 1973, Ph.D. 1981, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1976, Harvard
Law School. I am grateful to Dean John Garvey and to the Boston College Law
School for supporting this research through the Carney Scholars Program. I am
also grateful to Karen Breda of the Boston College Law Library for her research
help. This Article was presented at a University of Southern California
Colloquium, and I am grateful for the comments I received there.
1. It was his reforms that that lengthened the law school curriculum to
three years; that required law students to possess an undergraduate degree;
and that instituted the case method as the primary form of legal instruction. See
Bruce A. Kimball, Young Christopher Langdell, 1826-1854: The Formation of an
Educational Reformer, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 189 (2002).
2. For discussions of classical contract theory, see GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995).
3. The case method of legal instruction remains in use today although it is
much changed from Langdell’s time. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND
EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994); Bruce
A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They
Are Not to Take as Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the
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is responsible for the low regard in which he is held today.
Contemporary writers have treated Langdell as a straw
man.4 To him, they have attributed such notions as:
 The law consists of self-evident legal propositions that
are independent of policy or justice.
 Legal decision making is a simple exercise of
deductive logic.
 Every case has a uniquely correct outcome.5
Ironically, this caricature of Langdell has increased his
importance while at the same time diminishing his
reputation. Most everyone has come to regard Langdell as
espousing an overly simplistic and erroneous view of the
law. Thus, despite the importance of his work, it has
received relatively little serious attention. There are two
books about him6 and only a few law review articles.7 Some

Classroom of the Early C. C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57
(1999); Russell Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36
VILL. L. REV. 517, 518 (1991).
4. Posner’s characterization of formalism is typical:
[Formalism is] the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case
from premises accepted as authoritative. Formalism enables a
commentator to pronounce the outcome of the case as being correct or
incorrect, in approximately the same way that the solution to a
mathematical problem can be pronounced correct or incorrect.
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986-87). Note
though that Posner characterizes this view as “related but not identical to the
‘formalism’ of Langdell and the other nineteenth-century American legal
formalists.” Id. (footnote omitted).
5. E.g., M.H. Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to
Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 96 (1986).
6. BRUCE KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION:
C. C. LANGDELL, 1826-1906 (2009); LAPIANA, supra note 3.
7. There are few articles that discuss Langdell’s views beyond a superficial
level. Of particular interest are Thomas C. Grey’s, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); Bruce A. Kimball’s, Langdell on Contracts and Legal
Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 345
(2007); Howard Schweber’s, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of the
Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW &
HIST. REV. 421 (1999); and Marcia Speziale’s, Langdell’s Concept of Law as
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histories have described his contributions to legal education.
Others have mentioned his legal theories, but there is little
extended discussion. In short, there has not been much
interest in the substance of his work.
In attending to the substance of Langdell’s work, it
becomes apparent that legal doctrine plays a central role.
For example, he describes his Summary of the Law of
Contracts8 (“Summary”) as a “concise statement and
exposition of the doctrines involved in [the] cases.”9 Here it
is important to see that Langdell’s use of the term “doctrine”
is entirely new and original. If one reads both the cases in
his casebook and his summary thereof, it is apparent that
what Langdell describes as the “doctrines involved” are
neither articulated nor expressed by the cases directly. In
fact, the notion of legal doctrine as something “involved” in
the cases is at the heart of Langdell’s contribution to
American jurisprudence.
The invention of legal doctrine brings us to the second
focus of this Article. Langdell’s great innovation was the
formulation of a theory about contracts that could stand as
the basis for legal decision making. Unlike previous
theories, this was not a mere summary of the cases. Nor did
it depend upon another type of normative theory such as
natural law. Instead Langdell’s doctrine represented a
freestanding legal theory based upon an analysis of legal
concepts. Thus, the modern notion of legal doctrine was at
the center of Langdell’s contribution to American law. It
was doctrine that Langdell sought to teach by the case
method; doctrine that formed the substance of his contract
theory; and doctrine that he believed should be consulted in
the decision of cases. We have difficulty understanding
Langdell precisely because of this fact. Modern theorists
tend to minimize the importance of legal doctrine.10 We do
not think of it as a freestanding legal theory; rather, we
think it is a guise for other more practical considerations
Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L.
REV. 1 (1980).
8. C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY
[hereinafter LANGDELL, SUMMARY].

OF THE

LAW

OF

CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880)

9. Id. at iv.
10. E.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
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such as policy, efficiency, or substantive notions of justice.
Nevertheless, Langdell’s conception of doctrine remains an
important part of our legal culture. Like the air we breathe,
it is essential although it rarely excites our interest.
Whether we like it or not, we inevitably teach doctrine to
our students.11 We may teach other things as well; we may
even teach our students to be skeptical of doctrinal
arguments. Nevertheless, our students will emerge from our
classes with a fine-tuned sense about doctrine itself.
While we underestimate the importance of doctrine, we
overestimate its simplicity. We think of doctrine as a form of
legal analysis whose use is so well understood that there is
no need for methodological analysis. Our views about it are
casual and unreflective. We think about it as “Black Letter
Law,” and, just as we acknowledge that commercial outlines
are inadequate accounts of the law we teach, we think of the
“Black Letter Law” as an equally inadequate explanation of
legal decision making. If we talk about doctrine at all, we do
so in the shadow of many unstated assumptions. What we
think about doctrine depends upon what we think about the
nature of legal reasoning, the significance of precedent, or
the relationship between doctrine and policy. By contrast,
Langdell utilizes a particular conception of doctrine that
has both insight and power.
To explore these issues, I will proceed as follows:
Part I will examine the state of contract law prior to
Langdell. This is important because it is difficult to see how
innovative Langdell truly is unless one can compare his
theory to what went before.
Part II will compare the theory of contract formation
contained in Langdell’s Summary to the law as described by
the cases in the Casebook. This essentially enables us to
take Langdell’s course. We, with the students, learn how
the theory is derived from the cases.
Part III talks about Langdell’s method. There has been
a lot of confusion about the nature of Langdell’s enterprise.
I address this confusion by referring to the text that was
11. In each substantive course, students learn some form of doctrine—a
particular legal language that enables them to make arguments that are both
well formed and legally relevant.
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used to teach Langdell and his contemporaries about logic
and the methodology of science.
Part IV considers the issue of justification. Part IV.A
articulates a justificatory argument that Langdell himself
might have deployed. Part IV.B returns to the contemporary
non-Langdellian world in order to consider the value of
doctrine in legal knowledge and legal decision making.
Doctrine, I argue, is a strategy that mediates between the
rule of law and a jurisprudence of intuition in individual
cases. I also argue that a correct understanding of legal
doctrine clarifies what most lawyers already seem to
know—that legal doctrine is only one of a number of
considerations that guide a skillful legal analysis.
The last part is a conclusion.
I. PRE-LANGDELL CONTRACT LAW
Prior to Langdell, there were several influential sources
of contract law. First and most importantly, there were the
cases. These will be discussed in the next section. There
were also the commentaries by Blackstone12 and Kent13 as
well as Parsons’ treatise on Contract law.14 In this part, I
describe the content of these materials.
A. Blackstone’s Commentaries
Blackstone’s Commentaries,15 published in 1752,
represented the first comprehensive survey of English law.
It quickly became the mainstay of legal education and
scholarship. At the heart of its influence was its structure.16
The work was based on a central vision of law as a unified
subject that could be dissected into logical segments. Thus,
for example, one part dealt with rights and a second with
12. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
13. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1827).
14. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1864).
15. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12.
16. While the Commentaries do begin with a discussion of the nature and
origins of English law, these philosophical reflections were controversial and
hardly responsible for the continuing influence of the Commentaries. See JAMES
E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970, at 15 (1990).
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wrongs.17 These two parts were further subdivided—the
first into the rights of persons and the rights of property;
the second into private wrongs and public wrongs. Within
each of these subdivisions a group of chapters was loosely
organized around individual legal concepts. This
organization served a practical purpose. Blackstone had not
only provided a teaching text; but also, by providing a
logical structure, he had facilitated legal research.
Mastering his structure became the key to locating relevant
legal authority.
There are two things that are striking about
Blackstone’s treatment of contracts. First, in Blackstone’s
scheme, there was no general notion of contractual
obligation.18 Instead, he presents the field of contract law
only as an adjunct to a well-developed law of property.
Contracts are discussed in a chapter called—“Of Title by
Gift, Grant, and Contract”—which is one of seven chapters
dealing with questions of title to personal property. 19 This
chapter appears in the title part of the section on personal
property, which is a subdivision of the section on property,
which is a subdivision of the rights of things, which is a
subdivision of the section dealing with rights. Thus, in
Blackstone, the concept of contract must be considered an
extremely marginal category.
The second thing that is striking about Blackstone’s
treatment is its extreme generality. The discussion begins
with a definition: “A contract is an agreement, upon
sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular
thing.”20 This definition, in turn, gives rise to a tripartite
division of the subject: first a discussion of “Agreements”;
17. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, passim (rights); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 12, passim (wrongs).
18. Indeed, it would have been inconsistent with his organization to do so.
Blackstone treats theories of liability in the section on private wrongs—a section
that was exclusively devoted to what we would now think of as torts. See 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 12.
19. When Blackstone discusses the different types of contracts, we learn that,
despite the placement of the contracts discussion into the section on title, some
common contracts—such as the insurance and debt—have little to do with the
issue of title as we think of it today. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *46070.
20. Id. at *446.
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second, a discussion of “Consideration”; and third, a
discussion of the “Thing Agreed to be Done.” Only the first
two parts deal with contracts generally, and these are
exceedingly brief.21 Blackstone’s analysis of “the agreement”
can be summed up as follows:
 An agreement is a mutual bargain made by two
parties having legal capacity.22
 Such bargains can be express, as when “the terms of
the agreement are openly uttered and avowed at the time of
the making.”23
 They can also be implied as when “reason and justice
dictate.”24
 An agreement can be executed or executory.25
Similarly, Blackstone does not tell us much about
consideration. Much of his exposition is taken up with the
technicalities of the Civil Law doctrine.26 He then briefly
states that the English doctrine requires consideration but
does not duplicate the technicalities of the Civil Law. He
states that “any degree of reciprocity” will preserve the
validity of the agreements.27 He also reports that certain
kinds of contracts, notably notes and bonds, require no
consideration as they have been “authentically proved by
written documents.”28

21. The discussion of agreements and consideration take up five pages of the
thirty-eight that are devoted to contract law. Id. at *442-46.
22. Id. at *442.
23. Id. at *443.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The Civil Law, Blackstone states, makes a distinction between good and
valuable consideration. Under the Civil Law, there are only four permissible
categories of valuable consideration—money or goods, labor, marriage, or the
forbearance of litigation. Id. at *444-45.
27. Id. at *445.
28. Id. at *446. Note that lack of consideration is not a defense for the maker
of the note but may be for third-party creditors.
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To a modern reader, Blackstone’s analysis is
remarkable not for what is included but for what is left out.
There is no discussion of questions that will assume great
importance a century later. For example: How do the
parties make a contract? When is it complete? What is
meant by the mutuality requirement? Under what
circumstances would reason and justice require the
inference of a contract? To understand these omissions, it is
necessary to consider the commercial context in which
Blackstone wrote. When Blackstone wrote, the use of
contracts to order private affairs was mainly limited to four
particular contexts:
1. the purchase of goods (Sales);
2. the entrusting of goods (Bailments);
3. the lease of goods (Hiring or Borrowing); and
4. the memorializing of money owed (Debts).29
Blackstone’s analysis treats each of these areas
separately. In each case, the legal rules reflect the customs
surrounding their use. For example, the discussion of sales
reflects the following rules:
 The vendor has the right to sell his goods to any
person and on such terms as he pleases.30
 The person who buys the goods cannot take them
away until he has paid for them.31
 If a bargain is struck, but both sides walk away, the
vendor is free to dispose of the goods to someone else.32
 If, however, any fraction of the price has been paid,
the vendor must hold the goods for the purchaser.33
29. These are reflected in the four sections Blackstone uses to describe the
“thing agreed to be done.” Id.
30. Id. at *447.
31. Id. This is a default rule. The sales contract can expressly provide
otherwise.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *447-48.
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These represent the customary rules in a market
situation where all bargaining is face-to-face and the subject
of the sale is a particular piece of property that can be
inspected equally by buyer and seller.34 Thus, these simple
rules are more than sufficient to regulate such issues as
consideration, description, disclosures, delivery, title, etc.35
It is in these banal circumstances that we can see the
true nature of Blackstone’s enterprise. Blackstone saw
himself as a scientist, whose job was to organize the law.
While the point of his work was organization, its ongoing
method was descriptive. Blackstone does not analyze legal
doctrine, nor does he attempt to theorize it. Instead, he is
reporting on the traditions and customs of the English
people as they are assumed and enforced by English courts.
If the resulting legal rules seem to be general and
indeterminate, it makes little difference because they are
supplemented by custom and usage. Certain questions will
not arise because the parties are acting in accordance with
norms—both stated and unstated—that have been long
recognized in a particular context. In such a context there is
little room for the “law of contracts” as that term is
understood today. A commercial society that has longstanding, but relatively simple, commercial practices has
little need for doctrinal theorizing.36 In such societies, the
term “contract” does not denote a broad substantive area of
the law. Instead, as is evident in Blackstone’s writings, it
names a collection of commercial practices that share only a
few definitional requirements.
It is important to see this aspect of Blackstone, because,
soon after the Commentaries were published, the traditional

34. More complicated sales transactions require more specific rules. Thus,
there is a separate discussion that deals with the sale of horses. See id. at *45052.
35. Of course, warranties remain a problem, but they are specifically dealt
with in a separate section. See id. at *452.
36. And, as the third section shows, to the extent that commercial practices
had developed in Blackstone’s time, they tended to be governed by a particular
set of technical rules that arose from the practices themselves. See, for example,
the discussion of insurance contracts, bills of exchange, and promissory notes.
Id. at *460-70.
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contexts began to change.37 This change can be clearly
observed in Kent’s Commentaries.
B. Kent’s Commentaries
Seventy-five
years
after
Blackstone,
Kent’s
Commentaries38 were published in the United States. It was
the first comprehensive treatment of American law that was
entirely independent of Blackstone.39 But, while the text
was original, the structure was not. Contract law, for
example, was treated as a part of the section on personal
property40 and, as in Blackstone, the discussion was divided
into some very brief remarks about contracts in general41
and a more extensive treatment of the specific types of
contracts.42 Despite these similarities, there is much that is
37. We can see this in Blackstone’s discussion of marine insurance where he
recognizes that “[t]he learning relating to marine insurances [has] of late years
been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions.” Id. at *461. Having
stated this, however, he rues the fact that these rules “being founded on
equitable principles, which chiefly result from the special circumstances of the
case, [are] not easy to reduce them to any general heads in mere elementary
institutes.” Id.
38. 2 KENT, supra note 13.
39. The earliest American treatise was edited by Henry St. George Tucker
who used Blackstone’s basic text and added annotations detailing the decisions
of American courts. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, NOTES ON BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS (1826).
40. See 2 KENT, supra note 13, at vi-vii. Note though that Kent does not
rigorously adhere to the structure. For example, see the discussion of sales
contracts, contained in Part V dealing with personal property, which includes
cases that relate to the sales of real property. Id. at 367-74.
41. Like Blackstone, Kent divides the general law of contracts into three
sections. Section 1, “Of the different kinds of contracts,” covers much the same
ground that was covered in Blackstone’s section on the “Agreement of the
Parties.” Like Blackstone, Kent distinguishes the various types of contracts
(executory and executed contracts; verbal and written contracts; contracts under
seal and contract not under seal; and express and implied contracts). Id. at 36364. He then outlines the difference between an interest in possession and an
interest in action. Id. Kent then adds a brief discussion of the fact that contracts
are governed by the law of the place where they are made. Id. at 364.
42. There are eight lectures dealing with the various types of contracts:
Lecture 39, “Of the Contract of Sale”; Lecture 40, “Of Bailment”; Lecture 41 “Of
Principal and Agent”; Lecture 43, “Of the Law of Partnership”; Lecture 44, “Of
Negotiable Paper”; Lecture 47, “Of the Contract of Affreigtment”; Lecture 48,
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original in Kent’s work. For Kent, contract law is no longer
a matter of simply recording certain commercial practices.
He begins his discussion with a few introductory words:
In entering upon so extensive and so complicated a field of inquiry
as that concerning contracts, we must necessarily confine our
attention to a general outline of the subject; and endeavour to
collect and arrange, in simple and perspicuous order, those great
fundamental principles which govern the doctrine of contracts,
and pervade them under all their modifications and variety.43

Thus, even though Kent joins Blackstone in seeing
contracts as an adjunct to property law; he nevertheless
recognizes contracts as a “complicated” field requiring
“great fundamental principles” arranged in a “simple and
perspicuous order.” Despite this recognition, however, we
find in Kent the same abbreviated discussion of the general
concept of contract. First, there is a section that deals with
the types of contract. It begins with a general definition of
contract as “an agreement upon sufficient consideration, to
do or not to do a particular thing.”44 It then proceeds to
describe the various kinds of contracts, defining the
difference between contracts under seal and those not under
seal, those that are executed and those that are executor,
and those that are express and those that are implied. The
second section “explains” consideration. The explanation,
though, is simply a matter of stating that American courts,
like English courts, require consideration but reject the
Civil Law’s technical treatment of the issue.45 Beyond this,
Kent has little to say except to state the requirement that
nature of the consideration may not be “repugnant to law,
or sound policy, or good morals.”46

“Of the Law of Insurance”; and Lecture 49, “Of Maritime Law.” See id. at vii-viii;
3 KENT, supra note 13, at iv-v.
43. 2 KENT, supra note 13, at 363.
44. Id.
45. Unlike Blackstone, however, he does not treat consideration as a “motive”
or “cause” of the contract, and instead gives it its modern meaning as something
that is “either a benefit to the party promising, or some trouble or prejudice to
the party to whom the promise is made.” Id. at 365 (citing Jones v.
Ashburnham, (1804) 102 Eng. Rep. 905 (K.B.)).
46. Id. at 366.
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Like Blackstone, the bulk of Kent’s discussion relates to
the subject matter of various contracts.47 Again, I will take
as an example the discussion of sales. The length of this
discussion reflects the fact that, in the decades since
Blackstone, sales transactions have become more complex.48
Furthermore, compared to Blackstone, Kent’s analysis is
decidedly more analytical. Gone are the simple declarative
sentences, annotated with historical authority. In their
place, Kent has substituted a critical account of the relevant
precedents, agreeing with some and disagreeing with
others. For example, in the context of a discussion of the
seller’s inability to perform a sales contract, he goes to great
lengths to show the considerable inconsistencies in the case
law.49 He also is quick to point out discrepancies between
what he understands to be “the technical rule” and the
“[t]he justice of the case.”50 And, finally, he concludes the
discussion by calling for a more rational approach:
It is to be regretted, that the embarrassment and contradiction
which accompany the English and American cases on this subject,
cannot be relieved by the establishment of some clear and definite
rule . . . which shall be of controlling influence and universal
reception.51

Thus, Kent begins by reciting the need for clear and
definite rules and ends by recognizing that such rules have
not been found in the cases.
The absence of rules has important consequences for the
theory of contracts. If there are rules, then new cases must
be decided in accordance with them.52 Without rules,
47. Lecture 39 deals with sales contracts; Lecture 40 deals with bailments;
Lecture 41 deals with principals and agents; and Lecture 42 deals with
maritime law. Id. at vii-viii.
48. Under the topic of sales, Kent discusses warranties, disclosures, passing
title by delivery, the Statute of Frauds, sales affected by fraud, sales at auction,
and stoppage in transitu. See id.
49. See id. at 368-69.
50. Id. at 371.
51. Id. at 374.
52. While rules are not entirely outcome-determinative in their application,
they represent a particular way of comparing cases. A rule specifies the
characteristic that makes a case similar to one previously decided. Without a
rule, one is left to a more general comparison.
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however, precedent must operate on a case-by-case basis.
This means that the inquiry in each new case is whether
the case is so similar to a prior case that the result in the
prior case must be controlling. This judgment of similarity
can be very subjective—one person’s “similar” facts are
“distinguishable” to another. This might leave the court
with little reason to decide the case one way or another. To
address this, Kent’s arguments take on a modern cast.
Similarity, for him, is not simply likeness, but involves two
other considerations. First, there is the question of
consistency. Because Kent highlights the underlying
reasoning that supports a judicial decision, he facilitates
inquiry into the consistency of this reasoning among a large
number of cases. Second, there is the question of policy.
Kent highlights justice and policy as important grounds of
legal decision making.53 This adds an additional dimension
to discussions of similarity by allowing the litigants to
compare not only the facts of the two cases but also the
policies that are implicated. Cases can be seen as similar
not just because they invoke similar facts, but also because
they involve similar considerations of justice and utility.
Thus, even though Kent does not supply us with an
articulation of contract doctrine, he provides the beginning
of an analysis that deepens the discussion of relevant
precedent.
C. Parsons’ The Law of Contracts
The Law of Contracts54 by Parsons was published in
1855 and occupies a special place in any discussion of
Langdell’s theory of contract law. Parsons not only taught
Langdell, but served as a kind of mentor. It was Parsons
who helped to arrange the Harvard librarianship that
allowed Langdell to continue his studies.55 From his post in
the library, Langdell made substantial contributions to
Parsons’ work on his treatise and these were duly
acknowledged by the author.56 Thus, we know that Langdell
was thoroughly familiar with Parsons’ work and that it
53. See id. at 364, 368.
54. PARSONS, supra note 14.
55. Langdell held the post from 1852-1854. See Kimball, supra note 1, at 225.
56. PARSONS, supra note 14, at xiv.
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makes sense to regard it as a kind of starting point for
Langdell’s own thoughts about contract law.
Parsons’ book is a three-volume work devoted
exclusively to contracts. Its length indicates the growing
volume and diversity of commercial activity. It also reflects
a growing sense that the notion of contract was a central
rather than a marginal category of American law. In fact,
Parsons begins his treatise with just this sentiment:
The Law of Contracts, in its widest extent, may be regarded as
including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of
human life. Indeed, it may be looked upon as the basis of human
society. All social life presumes it, and rests upon it; for out of
contracts, express or implied, declared or understood, grow all
rights, all duties, all obligations, and all law. Almost the whole
procedure of human life implies, or, rather, is, the continual
fulfillment of contracts.57

Note that, in little more than a century, what was
treated by Blackstone and Kent as a technical device for
conveying title had become, in Parsons’ hands, the source of
all, or nearly all, human obligation.
Parsons’ treatise has a distinctly modern look. In
Blackstone and Kent, the bulk of the discussion related to
particular types of contracts and the rules that governed
each type. In Parsons, less than half of the text is devoted to
this type of analysis.58 Instead, the text is organized around
certain contract doctrines which are presumed to apply to
all types of contracts. This gives the appearance that
contracts is not only an important aspect of law, but also a
unified one. However, the presumption of general
applicability creates a need to note the many exceptions and
counterexamples for each given category. This means that
the text becomes more complicated and that clarity must be
sacrificed to subtlety and particularity. All of this makes
57. Id. at 3.
58. The first volume is divided into three parts: the first deals with the
parties to a contract, the second with consideration and assent; and the third
with the subject matter of contracts. The second volume assumes a binding
contract and considers the various issues that arise in connection with its
enforcement. Thus, it is only the third section of the first volume that deals with
individual types of contracts. Id. at xxiii-xxxvi.
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reading Parsons a frustrating experience as the following
brief excerpt amply demonstrates:
A promise is good consideration for a promise. And it is so
previous to performance and without performance. As if one
promises to become a partner in a firm, and another promises to
receive him into the firm, both of these promises are binding, each
being a sufficient consideration for the other. If one promises to
teach a certain trade, this is consideration for a promise to remain
with the party a certain length of time to learn, and serve him
during that time; but, without such a promise to teach, the
promise to remain and serve, though it be made in expectation of
instruction, is void. The reason of this is, that a promise is not a
good consideration for a promise unless there is an absolute
mutuality of engagement, so that each party has the right at once
to hold the other to a positive agreement.
This has been doubted, from the seeming want of mutuality in
many cases of contract. As where one promises to see another
paid, if he will sell goods to a third person; or promises to give a
certain sum if another will deliver up certain documents or
securities, or if he will forbear a demand, or suspend legal
proceedings or the like. Here it is said that the party making the
promise is bound, while the other party is at liberty to do anything
or nothing. But this is a mistake. The party making the promise is
bound to nothing until the promisee within a reasonable time
engages to do, or else does or begins to do, the thing which is the
condition of the first promise. Until such engagement . . . on the
part of the promisee which is sufficient to bind him, then the
promisor is bound also, because there is now a promise for a
promise, with entire mutuality of obligation . . . But if without any
promise whatever, the promisee does the thing required, then the
promisor is bound on another ground. The thing done is itself a
sufficient and a completed consideration; and the original promise
to do something, if the other party would do something, is a
continuing promise until that other party does the thing required
59
of him.

This passage begins with a clear statement that
promises will count as consideration, but, as the passage
continues, it becomes less clear as the matter becomes
entangled with the issue of mutuality—“a promise is not
good consideration for a promise unless there is an absolute
mutuality of engagement.” A reader unfamiliar with
modern contract doctrine might well conclude that a
promise will count as consideration only in certain
59. Id. at 448-51 (footnotes omitted).

566

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

circumstances, though he might be confused as to exactly
what those circumstances are.
Compare the confusion in Parsons’ treatise with the
relative clarity of Langdell’s treatment twenty years later.
Langdell treats the issue not as a question of consideration,
but as part of a newly invented topic of contract formation.
In addition, he introduces the now familiar distinction
between unilateral and bilateral contracts as a way of
clarifying the problem. This is his description:
Acceptance has hitherto been considered with reference to such
offers only as contemplate unilateral contracts. When the contract
is to be bilateral, though the principles are the same, the
application of them is very different. It still remains true that the
offer requires an acceptance and the giving of the consideration to
convert into a binding promise; but as the consideration consists
of a counter-promise, so the giving of the consideration consists in
making this counter-promise. It follows also that the original offer
cannot become a binding promise until the counter-promise also
becomes valid and binding.60

In this way, Langdell reconceptualizes the problem with
the result that it is possible to specify a relatively simple
rule regarding mutuality of promises: an offer to make a
promise in exchange for a promise does not become binding
until the offer is accepted.
Conclusion and Summary to Part I
The progression from Blackstone to Kent, and then on
to Parsons, represents a certain set of developments in
contract law. We began with Blackstone and a relatively
simple exposition of the commercial practices that utilized
private contracts. The law that governed these practices
reflected the customs in the market place. Nearly a century
later, Kent’s treatment is also descriptive, although the
practices themselves have become more sophisticated. Kent
sees the need to bring consistency and order to these
practices, but is unable to attain this ideal within the
confines of the relevant case law. Parsons, twenty five years
later, puts together a thorough compendium of contract law,
but in some ways makes the situation worse. His attempt to
unify the law of contracts results in confusion and
60. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 12.
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inconsistency. It is therefore left to Langdell to restore order
and simplicity. In the next part, we will consider how he
accomplishes this.
II. LANGDELL’S INNOVATION
Langdell’s work in contract law is contained in two
separate volumes. The first is a casebook meant to be used
in his class on contract law (“Casebook”);61 and the second is
his Summary.62 The Summary was first published as a
supplement to the Casebook and, only later, published
independently as a freestanding treatise. What is
remarkable about the two volumes is that the “law”
contained in the Casebook is so different from what is
contained in the Summary. This discrepancy makes it clear
that Langdell did not use the case method solely to question
and drill students on what they had already read in the
cases. Nor did he use class discussions merely to raise
minor points of clarification or comparison.63 Instead, he
expected the students—obviously with his help—to learn
lessons from the cases that were not directly stated in the
cases themselves. Specifically, Langdell is not teaching the
theory articulated in the cases. Rather, he is showing that a
new theory makes better sense of the cases. In order to
show the nature of Langdell’s theory, it is necessary to
compare it to the legal theory contained in the cases. I will
therefore begin by going through a part of the Casebook as a
student might have done in 1880 (Part II.A). I will then, by
way of contrast, demonstrate the way in which his theory
analyzes and decides these same cases (Part II.B). This will
show that Langdell’s theory, rather than being some
mechanical compilation, is in fact a creative effort to
synthesize a complex and confusing area of law.
I apologize in advance to readers who teach contracts.
These readers will certainly find the following discussion
somewhat obvious and pedantic. However, for those of us
61. See C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d
ed. 1879) [hereinafter LANGDELL, CASEBOOK].
62. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8.
63. Bruce Kimball argues that Langdell’s marginalia suggest the kind of
technical questions that Langdell addressed to his students. See Kimball, supra
note 3, at 66-77.
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who do not teach contracts, the various points require
elaboration. And for all readers, it is important to
distinguish Langdell’s actual theory from those that came
later, and are presumed by modern casebooks.
A. The Law Expressed in the Casebook
It seems important to note that Langdell’s Casebook is
quite different from those in use today. There are no notes
or commentary. The only organization is that there are
three sections, and a number of subsections into which the
cases are divided. I will specifically examine the first section
of the Casebook which is entitled “Mutual Consent.”64 The
twenty-five cases in this section are not presented in any
particular order beyond the obvious fact that: one, there are
two lines of cases, the first English and the second
American; and, two, the cases within each line progress
from the oldest and simplest, to the most recent and most
complex. In this section of the Article, I will confine my
comments to the first line of English cases solely to avoid
length and repetition.
The first two cases are from the eighteenth century and
provide a framework for analyzing the problem of contract
formation. The first, Payne v. Cave,65 is an auction case
involving the following sequence: (1) the plaintiff put up a
piece of merchandise; (2) the defendant placed a bid; and,
(3) the defendant revoked his bid before the hammer fell.
The court held that there was no contract because the
auctioneer had not brought down the hammer before the
revocation was made. The decisive argument on behalf of
64. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at xi. This first section is followed by
two others: “Consideration” and “Conditional Contracts.” The section on
Consideration is further subdivided as follows: Nature of Consideration; From
whom the Consideration must move; What Contracts Require a Consideration;
Sufficiency of Consideration in General; Forbearance; Compromise; Moral
Consideration; Gratuitous Bailment; Mutual Promises; Consideration Void in
Part; and Executed Consideration. The section on Conditional Contracts is
further divided: Conditions Precedent; Independent Covenants and Promises;
Mutual and Concurrent Conditions; Conditions Subsequent; Performance of
Conditions, and how it should be averred; Part Performance of Conditions, and
Effect thereof; Waiver of Performance, and Effect thereof; Contracts Conditional
Upon Demand; and Contracts Conditional upon Notice. Id. at xi-xiii.
65. (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra
note 61, at 1.
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the defendant was that there was no mutuality of
obligation. Before the hammer fell, the court reasoned, the
seller could have walked away from the sale.66 Since the
seller had no obligation, he had furnished no consideration,
and this left the buyer’s agreement to pay without
consideration as well.
The second case, Cooke v. Oxley67 involved a similar
situation. In that case, a merchant offered to sell a certain
amount of tobacco to the plaintiff. The seller also agreed to
give the buyer until 4 p.m. to accept his offer. The plaintiff
did accept the offer before 4 p.m., but the defendant, in the
meantime, decided not to sell. The court held there was no
contract. Again, the seller’s promise to wait for an answer
was without consideration, and could not itself serve as
consideration for the buyer’s promise to purchase.68
These two cases seem strange to a modern reader, but
they are both decided upon a particular principle. I will
refer to this principle as the “mutuality principle.” The
mutuality principle follows from the definition of contract as
an agreement upon sufficient consideration.69 The courts
understood this as requiring that each party must agree to
the contract and furnish consideration. If either party failed
either requirement, then no contract was formed—there
was simply a nudum pactum that could not be legally
enforced. These requirements resulted in a number of issues
about timing. Indeed, the timing issue proved crucial in
many cases. The reason for this is not hard to see. If there is
any time between one promise and the other, then, for that
time, the first promise will not be binding. This means that
66. “The auctioneer is the agent of the vendor, and the assent of both parties
is necessary to make the contract binding; and that is signified on the part of
seller by knocking down the hammer, which was not done here until the
defendant had retracted.” Payne, 100 Eng. Rep. at 503. This illustrates the
indecisiveness of the rule about mutuality of obligation. Why is there no
contract before the hammer came down? Could the seller really have walked
away? The mutuality rule does not decide this case unless both questions are
answered in the affirmative.
67. (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra
note 61, at 2.
68. Cooke, 100 Eng. Rep. at 786.
69. See 2 KENT, supra note 13, at 363 (“An executory contract is an agreement
upon sufficient consideration to do or not do a particular thing.”).
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the second promise fails because the original promise, being
a nudum pactum, does not count as consideration. The only
way to make a contract, given these requirements, is for
both parties to make their agreements simultaneously.
Since true simultaneity is seldom achieved, the courts
treated the agreements as simultaneous if they were made
in the course of an ongoing, face-to-face discussion. This
created a problem for the plaintiff in Cooke, because the
initial discussion had been terminated when he left to
consider the defendant’s offer.
One problem with this result is its potential unfairness.
Not knowing the law, a buyer will be deceived by the seller’s
promise of time to consider. An even more serious problem,
however, arises when the contract is negotiated by mail.
This is illustrated by Adams v. Lindsell.70 In Adams, the
defendant wrote to the plaintiff, offering to sell goods at a
certain price. The letter was misaddressed and arrived
three days late. When it arrived, the plaintiff accepted by
return post. In the meantime, the defendant, having not
heard from the plaintiff, sold the goods to someone else. The
defendant argued that there was no contract because of the
mutuality requirement. The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that if there was no binding contract until
plaintiff’s answer was received, then
no contract could ever be completed by the post. For if the
defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by the
plaintiffs till the answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought
not to be bound till after they had received the notification that
the defendants had received their answer and assented to it. And
so it might go on ad infinitum.71

Thus, the court recognizes the problem that would
result if it required simultaneity in the context of contracts
by mail. They therefore developed a fiction to deal with this
situation. They would treat the offer as being continuously
reaffirmed so long as the letter is travelling. In this way,
contracts by letter came to resemble the face-to-face
situation where simultaneity is presumed from the fact that

70. (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra
note 61, at 4.
71. Adams, 106 Eng. Rep. at 251.
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the promises take place in the course of the same
conversation.
Following Adams are two more cases where
simultaneity was at issue. Routledge v. Grant72 is another
case where the defendant-lessor sought to revoke his
promise before he had received the counter-promise of the
plaintiff-lessee. The plaintiff argued that the court had
abandoned the simultaneity principle in Adams. However,
two members of the court rejected this argument and held
that there was no valid contract.73 A third relied on alleged
variances between the two promises to reach the same
result. 74
The second case, Head v. Diggon,75 involved similar
facts. The defendant in Head made an offer to sell and left
three days for the plaintiff’s response. Whether the
plaintiff’s response was timely depended on whether
Sunday was included in the calculation. The court, however,
ignored the Sunday issue and applied the mutuality
principle to hold that there was no contract.76
After Head, it must be taken as clearly established that
the only exception to the mutuality principle was the mail
rule developed in Adams. This being so, the result in Hyde
v. Wrench77 should not surprise us. In Hyde, there was a
face-to-face price negotiation. The defendant offered to sell
at 1200 and the plaintiff refused. The defendant then
offered a sale price of 1000, and the plaintiff countered at
950. At that point the interview was over, and the
defendant asked for time to think it over. When they
72. (1828) 130 Eng. Rep. 920 (C.P.D.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK,
supra note 61, at 6.
73. Routledge, 130 Eng. Rep. at 922-23.
74. One was a seven-day variance related to the time of occupancy; the
second occurred because although the plaintiff had accepted the offer, he had
not yet executed a lease that would have given him the legal right to sublet the
property for the entire period. Id.
75. (1828) 3 Man. & R. 97 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra
note 61, at 10.
76. Head, 3 Man & R. at 98-100.
77. (1840) 49 Eng. Rep. 132 (L.R.Ch.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK,
supra note 61, at 13.
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resumed negotiations, the defendant rejected the offer of
950. When the plaintiff tried to take advantage of the
earlier offer of 1000, the defendant refused. The court,
confronted with these facts simply said:
The Defendant offered to sell it for £1,000, and if that had been at
once unconditionally accepted, there would undoubtedly have
been a perfect binding contract; instead of that, the Plaintiff made
an offer of his own, to purchase the property for £950, and he
thereby rejected the offer previously made by the Defendant. I
think that it was not afterwards competent for him to revive the
proposal of the Defendant . . . and that, therefore, there exists no
obligation of any sort between the parties. . . .78

Note that the mutuality principle alone would be
enough to settle the case, but the court seems to indicate a
further reason, namely that, once a proposal is rejected, it
cannot be revived.
The next case, Williams v. Cardwardine,79 does not
seem to belong in a set of cases dealing with the mutuality
principle. In Williams, the defendant offered a reward for
information leading to the arrest of a murderer. The
plaintiff, who had been beaten by the murderer, made a
statement that led to his arrest. The reason for this
statement was that she “believ[ed] she had not long to live,
and to ease her conscience[.]”80 When she subsequently
claimed the reward, the defendant refused, arguing that she
had provided the information for her own reasons and that
her action was not intended as consideration.
The mutuality principle was not relevant to this case.81
Instead, the question was whether the plaintiff’s actions

78. Hyde, 49 Eng. Rep. at 133.
79. (1833) 110 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra
note 61, at 12.
80. Williams, 110 Eng. Rep. at 590.
81. The modern reader, familiar with Langdell’s distinction between
unilateral and bilateral contracts, has no trouble discerning the reason that
mutuality is not relevant here. The defendant’s offer was an offer for a
unilateral contract that could be accepted by performing the act required in the
offer, namely the provision of information. The offer to reward was never
revoked. It remained open until the time when the plaintiff did the act that
completed the contract. From Langdell’s point of view, however, the problem in
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provided the required consideration given that they were
not intended as such. The court held that they did, ruling
that the plaintiff’s motives were irrelevant.82
The next two cases return to the postal context and
address the issue of what happens when letters cross in the
mail. The first case, Potter v. Sanders,83 does not involve a
contract at all. This case involved the sale of real estate
where the seller, Sanders, had been negotiating with two
different parties. The first was the plaintiff, Potter. The
second was a man named Coates who was negotiating with
Sanders’ father. The plaintiff sued for specific performance
alleging that the father had notice of the sale to the plaintiff
before he completed the second sale.84 While there were
numerous questions that affected the case, the court chose
its issue carefully. It said that the issue was one of notice:
did the father, whose son had written to him the day before
informing him of the first sale, have notice of the first sale
absent proof that the letter had actually been received by
the father prior to the second sale? The court decided that it
did not matter when the son’s letter had been received, so
long as the letter had been mailed on the 23rd. It wrote:
I think the vendor, when he put into the post office the letter to
the Plaintiff of the 23d of April, did an act which, unless it was
interrupted in its progress, concluded the contract between
himself and the Plaintiff. I cannot, in short, doubt but that the
letter of the 23d was a revocation of the authority which the
vendor had given to his father to make a contract for him for the
sale of the estate.85

this case is that the plaintiff’s act should not count as consideration unless she
intended it as such.
82. Williams, 110 Eng. Rep. at 591.
83. (1846) 67 Eng. Rep. 1057 (L.R.Ch.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK,
supra note 61, at 15.
84. Potter, 67 Eng. Rep. at 1059. The knowledge that the property had been
sold would have terminated his agency for the son in the sale of the property,
thereby rendering his subsequent actions null and void.
85. Id. at 1061.
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Thus, it held that, with respect to termination of
agency, notice given by mail was effective at the time when
it was mailed, rather than when it was received.86
Dunlop v. Higgens,87 applies this rule to the contract
situation, where the plaintiff’s acceptance crossed in the
mail with the defendant’s revocation. The exact timing was
as follows:
 The defendant made the offer by mail on January
28th.
 The plaintiff received the offer on the 30th.
 It posted the acceptance on the afternoon of the 30th,
misdating the letter to the 31st.
 The letter was delayed in transit and received on
February 1st.
 The defendant posted a letter on February 1st
rescinding the offer.
Under Adams v. Lindsell,88 the offer was deemed to be
renewed and continued until the plaintiff had had time to
reply by return mail. This he did, however, notice of his
action did not come to the defendant until he received the
delayed letter on February 1. The court held that this delay
was irrelevant. “The mailbox rule” permitted the court to
deem that the contract was complete the moment that the
letter was placed in the mailbox.89
Offord v. Davies90 involves a guarantee. In Offord, the
defendants rescinded their guarantee during the period
between making the guarantee and plaintiff’s reliance upon

86. Id.
87. (1848) 9 Eng. Rep. 805 (H.L.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra
note 61, at 21.
88. Dunlop, 9 Eng. Rep. at 808.
89. Id. at 807-08.
90. (1862) 142 Eng. Rep. 1336 (C.P.D.), reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK,
supra note 61, at 33.
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it. The court held that the rescission was valid since there
was no binding contract during this period.91
This seems a straightforward application of the
mutuality principle; since the plaintiff had not yet furnished
consideration, and indeed was not yet bound to furnish it,
the furnishing of consideration was not simultaneous, and
therefore the parties had failed to form a contract. Note,
however, that the application of the simultaneity
requirement would make it virtually impossible to have a
binding guarantee in these circumstances. In any case, the
court declines to find that there was no contract, but rather
ruled that the guarantor’s agreement could be revoked at
any time before the other party had relied on the contract.92
Like Offord, the next three cases involve delays, but, in
these cases, the delays prove fatal. In the first, Ramsgate V.
H. v. Montefiore,93 the defendant applied to purchase certain
shares of stock. The transaction was delayed by the board’s
failure to act promptly on the application. In In re National
Savings Bank Association,94 the delay was the result of the
corporate agent’s failure to transmit the Board’s action in a
timely fashion. And in Eliason v. Henshaw,95 the seller sent
the acceptance by mail rather than by giving it to the man
who delivered the offer as required by the purchaser. In
each of these cases, the courts upheld revocations of the
offer made during the period of delay. Thus, we can see that
the postal rule is a special case. Offers remain open in the
postal case out of necessity. When, however, there is a delay
beyond the normal operation of the mail, the offer can be
rescinded.

91. Offord, 142 Eng. Rep. at 1340.
92. See id. at 1339-40.
93. (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 109, reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61,
at 43.
94. (1867) 4 L.R. Ch. 9, reprinted in LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at
42.
95. 17 U.S. 225, 226-27 (1819) (first of the American cases), reprinted in
LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at 71.
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Summary and Conclusion to Part II.A
These cases, taken together, suggest the following about
the topic of mutual consent.
The operative definition of a contract is: a contract is a
promise supported by consideration.
Without consideration, promises are unenforceable, and
this gives rise to the mutuality principle: one side cannot be
bound if the other is not.
Thus, “I will sell you this for ten dollars,” is not an
enforceable promise since it remains unsupported by
consideration. There is still no contract if the buyer replies:
“I will buy it for ten dollars.” This is because the seller’s
promise is unsupported by consideration and therefore not
binding, and a non-binding promise cannot count as
consideration. This gives rise to the simultaneity
requirement: both parties must become bound at the same
time.
The simultaneity requirement creates some difficult
issues about timing. Courts have resolved these issues as
follows:
 Two promises are simultaneous if they are made in
the course of a face-to-face interview.
 Two promises are simultaneous if they are made in
the regular course of the mail.
 If the second promise is made in the regular course, it
completes the contract at the time it is posted (the mail box
rule).
B. The Theory Contained in the Summary
Langdell’s theory does not consist of the rules outlined
above. Indeed, the point of the theory is to provide an
explanation of the cases while, at the same time, resolving
some of the inconsistencies and irrationalities. One of the
chief problems with the pre-Langdell theory is that, without
more, a promise on one side: “I will sell you this for ten
dollars” coupled with a promise on the other: “Fine, I will
pay ten dollars” does not result in a contract unless the
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parties are face to face or make their contract through the
mails.
One solution to this problem would be to eliminate the
requirement of consideration. This is obviously a radical
solution that would thoroughly change the law of
contracts.96 Langdell’s solution, however, leaves the law of
consideration intact, but instead modifies the requirements
for contract formation by introducing two new terms: offer
and acceptance. Langdell begins by referring to the Roman
rule that a promise is not a legal promise until it has been
accepted by the promisee.97 Prior to that, it is only an offer.
For example, if A promises to meet B at ten, A has made an
offer that can only be converted to a legal promise by B’s act
of acceptance. Thus, if a contract is a legal promise
supported by consideration every contract will require three
elements:
1. an offer;
2. an acceptance; and
3. consideration.98
It is important to note that the terms “offer” and
“acceptance” are technical terms, each having their own
particular properties.
1. Offer. An offer references two promises. One promise,
the proposal, is actually made in the offer—the offeror
promises that a specific promise will be forthcoming if the
offeree makes his acceptance. The second is the counterpromise that will not be made until acceptance is made.99 It
is the second promise that gives rise to the contractual
96. Langdell is reluctant to consider altering the rules with respect to
consideration. For example, in a passage where he examines the possibility of
eliminating consideration with respect to bills of exchange and insurance
policies, he writes, “[i]t can easily be shown, however, that this opinion is
irreconcilable with the nature of these contracts, even when judged by our law,
still more when judged by the custom of merchants, and that the decisions by
which it is supported, if they cannot be pronounced erroneous, must at least be
deemed anomalous.” LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 63.
97. Id. at l.
98. See id. at 1-5 (discussing the process of contract formation).
99. Id. at 14.
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obligation, but only if it, the second promise, is supported by
consideration from the other party.
An offer is a promise to make a promise. The offer can be
in words or signs and must be communicated to the offeree.100
So defined, the concept of an offer allows Langdell, to
introduce a radically new idea: the proposal in the offer, i.e.,
the promise to make a promise, is binding without
consideration so long as the offer remains open. Langdell’s
analysis therefore makes an important distinction between
offers and promises; with offers, a promise to make a
promise is binding once it is accepted by the offeree; with
promises, a promise is not binding until it is supported by
consideration. In these circumstances, the consideration
requirement applies only to the second promise, i.e. the one
that is promised in the offer. If the second promise is
without consideration, then it will not be binding.
If a plaintiff who makes an offer is bound thereby, it is
important to know when an offer expires. Under Langdell’s
theory,
An offer remains open until one of the following three
things happens:
1. It is rejected by the other party;101
2. It expires in accordance with its terms;102 or
3. It is revoked.103
The fact that proposals are binding in accordance with
their own terms has consequences for the cases described in
100. This summarizes Langdell’s description of a bilateral offer. See id.
101. Id. at 22-23.
102. Id. at 198. If an offer specifies its duration, then its expiration date is
stated in the offer. If it does not, then the following presumptions apply:
1. If the offer is made in a face to face interview, it expires at the end
of the interview. Id.
2. If the offer is made by mail, it expresses a willingness to receive the
acceptance in the same way. Id.
3. With respect to time, there is no general rule. The issue of
reasonable time is for the jury. Id. at 201.
103. Id. at 204, 240.
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the Casebook. For example, consider the situations
described in Cooke, Routledge, Head, and Hyde. Using
Langdell’s analysis, each of these cases involves an offer
that was binding until one of the above three things
happens. In Cooke, none of these had happened and so the
contract would be valid. In Routledge, if the variances were
fatal, then the offer had been revoked before any acceptance
became valid. In Head, the issue would be whether the offer
had expired. And, finally, in Hyde, the offer was closed
because the offeree had rejected it.
The notion of a binding offer also provides a different
result in auction cases such as Payne. Langdell notes the
confusion that the Payne rule can cause at an auction by
permitting uncertainty to attach to stated bids. He also
notes that there is no way for sellers to eliminate the rule
by contract since whatever effort they make to impose a
different rule will fall afoul of the mutuality principle. On
the other hand, Langdell’s theory disposes of the problem
with clarity. He suggests that a seller who puts up a good
for auction is making a legal offer to sell the item to the
highest bidder. As an offer, the promise (I will sell to the
highest bidder) is binding unless revoked. Therefore the
sale is completed when the highest bid is made. There is no
need to wait for the hammer to drop.104
In addition to distinguishing between an offer and an
acceptance, Langdell also makes a distinction between
bilateral and unilateral offers.105 A bilateral contract is a
two-sided contract—each side makes a promise in exchange
for the other side’s promise.106 A unilateral contract consists
of a promise on one side and an action on the other.107 Every
offer therefore is either an offer to make a unilateral
contract, or an offer to make a bilateral contract.
An example of an offer to make a bilateral contract is: I
promise to pay you ten dollars if you will promise to clean
your room.
104. Id. at 24-25 (comparing actual practice to holding in Payne v. Cave, (1789)
100 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B.)).
105. I believe it is Langdell who originates this distinction as there is no
mention of these in Kent, Blackstone, or Parsons.
106. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 249.
107. Id.
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An example of an offer to make a unilateral contract is:
I promise to pay you ten dollars if you clean your room.
In the first case, the offeror has indicated that the offer
can be accepted by making a promise. In the second, he or
she has indicated that the offer can only be accepted by the
offeree’s act of cleaning his or her room.
The offer in Offord must be understood as a unilateral
offer. The defendant offeror promises to guarantee certain
bills of exchange for a period of twelve months. The act
sought was that the plaintiff would discount the bills at the
plaintiff’s request. Since the defendant revoked its
guarantee before any bills had been discounted, no valid
contract had been formed. The contract could not be binding
until the plaintiff had accepted the contract by doing the
required act.
2. Acceptance. In Langdell’s theory, acceptances are
different from offers in a variety of ways. First, the proper
form of an acceptance is stipulated in the offer. For
example, it is the offeror who determines when the
acceptance must be made and how it must be
communicated. It is also the offeror who determines
whether the contract will be unilateral or bilateral by
stating whether the offer may be accepted by an act or by a
promise.108
Acceptance—An offer is accepted by performing the act
or making the promise required in the offer.109
In addition, the acceptance contains not just an explicit
acceptance of the original offer, but also an implied counteroffer. The counter-offer proposes the same contract as the
original offer and it is accepted by the acceptance that was
implied in the original offer. Thus, each contract represents
two sets of offer and acceptance: (1) the explicit offer made
in the original offer with the explicit acceptance contained
in the acceptance; and (2) the implied counter-offer made in
the acceptance with the implied acceptance made in the
original offer.110
108. See id. at 12.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 14.
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There is an asymmetry between offers and acceptances.
An offer is not considered made until it is communicated to
the offeree, whereas an acceptance is complete upon the
mental act of the offeree. This does not mean, however, that
notice of an acceptance is irrelevant. First it is the offeree’s
responsibility to give notice of the acceptance within a
reasonable time. Second, there is the additional concern
that every acceptance contains an implied offer. It is this
implied offer which, when accepted by the original offeror,
creates a binding promise for the original offeree, and
without this binding promise there is no consideration for
the contract. Because the acceptance contains an implied
counter-offer, it must be communicated to the original
offeree before any contract is formed. Thus, there is no
contract until the acceptance that implicitly contains the
counteroffer is received by the original offeror. This means
that despite the fact that acceptances need not be
communicated in order to be effective, the implicit counteroffer contained in the acceptance must be communicated.111
Certainly all of this seems convoluted, and one might
well ask: what is the point of including the implied counteroffer and acceptance? The answer is this. Langdell’s
formulation does two very desirable things. First, it
provides that there is no contract until both parties have
committed themselves and informed the other of their
commitment. Second, it avoids the inevitable regress noted
in Adams v. Lindsell. Once there is an exchange of letters,
the contract has been formed. The first party has made an
offer and has received an acceptance. The second party has
made an offer (implied in his acceptance) and received an
acceptance from the first party (implied in his offer). Thus,
at that point there are two promises, each supported by the
consideration provided in the other. There is no need for
further communication.
3. Consideration. In addition to an acceptance, the
offeree must provide consideration. In the case of a bilateral
offer, the consideration will be another promise. In the case
of a unilateral offer, it will be an act.112 In many cases, the

111. See id. at 15.
112. And further, the act must be complete to count as consideration. This
means, in an example familiar to first-year contracts students, that an offeror
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acceptance and the consideration will be the same act. For
example, if A makes an offer to pay B for going to the store
(an offer to make a unilateral contract), B’s trip to the store
will count as both the acceptance of A’s promise and
consideration for it. In other cases, however, one could have
consideration without acceptance. For example, B might
respond to the offer by deciding to go to the store as a favor
to A. In this case, B’s intention is fatal to the formation of
any contract. Acceptance and consideration must be
intended as such, and this requirement has an impact on
the reward cases such as Williams. Since the plaintiff in
Williams had her own reasons for giving the desired
information and was, in fact, ignorant of the reward for
doing so, his information could not count as an acceptance
or as consideration and there was therefore no contract
upon which he could recover. This means that Langdell’s
theory is at odds with the result in Williams.
4. Bilateral Contracts by Mail. Just as the mail cases
caused a problem for the simultaneity principle, they also
cause a problem for Langdell’s theory. In a simple case,
there is not much of a problem. If A mails an offer to B,
expecting a reply by return mail, then A’s letter is an offer
and the acceptance takes place as soon as B decides to
accept. Return mail provides reasonable notice of
acceptance. In Langdell’s theory, there is no need for a
fiction that the offer was remade continuously until
acceptance. So long as the offeror does not revoke the offer,
there is no problem. The difficulty rises when the offeror
decides to revoke during the period when the letters are in
transit.
In order to analyze such cases, it is necessary to review
the requirements for a contract. In the case of a bilateral
contract, each side must provide consideration and
consideration will be in the form of a promise. Each promise
requires an offer, an acceptance and consideration. Thus, an
offeror must not only make his offer; he must also accept
whatever promise is made by the offeree. Similarly for the
offeree, he must not only accept the offeror’s offer, but he
must also make an offer of his own. Consider then the
problem posed by the mailbox situation. The mailbox
situation is represented in the following chart:
who has promised to reward someone for climbing a flagpole can revoke at any
time before the offeree reaches the top.
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Party B, Initial
Offeree

I promise to pay you
if you will promise to
do X.
I accept your promise
to do X if such a
promise is
forthcoming.
(Implied)
I accept your
promise to pay me.

T2

I promise to do X.
(Implied)

T3

A revokes his original
offer and implied
acceptance.

T4

B’s acceptance and
implied offer arrives
in A’s mailbox.

At T3, the acceptance of A’s promise is complete, but B’s
counter-offer has not been communicated. There is therefore
no second promise and no consideration. As a result, A’s
revocation anytime before T4 will be effective to block
formation of a contract.
This result denies the so-called “mailbox rule,” and, as
Langdell acknowledges, is quite controversial.113 It is at this
point that he makes the statement about justice and
convenience that was so notably criticized by Holmes: “The
true answer to this argument[,]” (i.e., that justice and
convenience require the mailbox rule) “is that it is
irrelevant.”114 But, having said that it is irrelevant, Holmes
goes on to pursue the argument with some vigor, offering
113. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 18-22.
114. Oliver W. Holmes, Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880).
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two separate arguments: (1) the mailbox rule results in a
more substantial harm to the parties; and (2) rejection of
the mailbox rule facilitates prevention of the difficulty.115
However one feels about the mailbox rule, I take my
point as amply proven. The theory that Langdell articulates
in the Summary can be found nowhere in the cases. What
he has done, in offering his theory, is to tell a larger story,
and, given that no trace of the story can be found in the
cases, it must be regarded as solely his creation. To tell the
story, he has had to make up a technical vocabulary that,
while not as precisely defined as a mathematical formula, is
at least more definite than the mutuality principle and the
simultaneity requirement. Since so much of Langdell’s
theory is not found in the cases, one might reasonably ask:
why should anyone suppose that Langdell’s theory is true?
If it is not a description of how courts actually think, why
should anyone accept it as a theory of legal decision
making?
This brings us to the question of justification. However,
the difficulty in thinking about the justification for
Langdell’s theory is that he, himself, does not address the
issue. In fact, given that his theory represents a significant
innovation in American law, it is odd that he should be so
reticent about offering reasons to embrace it. He explains
some of the considerations that led him to use it as a
teaching method. He has also provided arguments that
favor certain results in particular cases. But nowhere does
he offer reasons to embrace the theory itself. For this
reason, the issue of justification requires a bit of a detour.
Langdell wrote in the late nineteenth century and,
fortunately, there are a number of sources that will help us
understand the notion of scientific method utilized by his
contemporaries. In the next part, I will examine these
materials and argue that one of the methods they describe
is, in fact, the method Langdell was using. This will permit
us, in the following part, to think about the problem of
justification.

115. Id.
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III. LANGDELL’S METHOD
Langdell was emphatic in describing his work as legal
science.116 As science, Langdell insisted that our approach to
law should be both rigorous and systematic.117 An
understanding of Langdell’s theories, however, requires
more than just some vague notion of what is logical and
scientific. In the nineteenth century, science was not a
precise concept.118 The term “science” could be applied to a
number of strikingly different methodologies. For example,
it was used to describe the classificatory systems of biology
and zoology as well as the predictive methods of physics and
chemistry. It could also used to describe mathematics, even
though its method was not generally understood as
empirical.119 In addition, there were a number of ideas about
how science could be applied to law. One such idea, of
course, was that exemplified by Blackstone whose
“scientific” method was solely a matter of organization.120
Another is illustrated by Holmes’ Common Law121 which
traces legal doctrines to their common law origins. Given
these variations, it is necessary to be specific about the type
of method Langdell used.
One way to understand Langdell’s method is to look at
the standard logical text that was used in his time.
Understanding what Langdell was taught about science is a
116. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at vi-vii. This description may have
been partly political since, during Langdell’s time, the term “legal science” was
the rallying cry for those who wished to move legal education out of the
practitioner’s offices and into university libraries. Nevertheless, it is clear that
Langdell’s interest in legal science was more than just political.
117. Id.
118. A general account of the method did not emerge until the twentieth
century when the logical positivists provided a rigorous analysis. E.g., KARL
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1935). While later philosophers of
science would quarrel with this account, the account itself remained the center
of discussion.
119. John Stuart Mill famously suggested that mathematics might be
empirical. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 147-72 (1906).
Thomas Grey adopted this suggestion, when he argued that Langdell’s method
was, in fact, inspired by geometry, but by Mill’s empirical account. See Grey,
supra note 7, at 19.
120. See supra Part I.A.
121. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
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good start towards understanding his use of a scientific
method. Thus in the first section, I will examine this text as
a guide to understanding Langdell’s own outlook on method
(Part III.A). I will then consider the common view that
Langdell’s theory is based on a logical system such as the
one used by geometry, concluding that this view is mistaken
(Part III.B). In the third section (Part III.C), I will consider
the possibility that Langdell’s work should be analogized to
the classificatory systems used by botany and zoology. I will
argue that this approach is incorrect because it overlooks
the fact that Langdell’s theory is normative as well as
descriptive. And finally, after rejecting both the
demonstrative and classificatory descriptions of Langdell’s
theory, I argue that it is synthetic in the sense that it
should be understood as utilizing the predictive model of
empirical science (Part III.D).
A. Langdell’s Logic Book
During the nineteenth century, logic was a required
course for undergraduates at Harvard.122 The course used a
series of books that began with Brattle’s Compendium of
Logick in 1687.123 When Langdell studied logic, the book in
use was Elements of Logick; or a Summary of the General
Principles and Different Modes of Reasoning, by Levi
Hedge.124 Hedge’s book was not limited to symbolic logic.
122. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD 1636-1936, at
235 (1964). Langdell went to Phillips Exeter and may have taken the course
there. In any case, the course at Exeter used the same book, Hedge’s Logick,
that was used at Harvard. See Letter from Shelley C. Bronk, Achieves Assistant
at Phillips Exeter Academy, to Sharon Fry (July 23, 2004) (on file with the
Buffalo Law Review).
123. See 1 ELIZABETH FLOWER & MURRAY G. MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 367 (1977). Brattle’s book was used at Harvard from its
publication until 1865 when it was followed by Isaac Watts’ LOGIC; OR THE RIGHT
USE OF REASON IN THE INQUIRY AFTER TRUTH (1825). Watts’ book was in use until
1827 when Hedge’s book was published. Nor was Hedge’s book the last in the
series. During Langdell’s time, Francis Bowen and his student Charles Peirce
were at work on a new text Treatise on Logic, published in 1864. Id. at 382-87;
FRANCIS BOWEN, A TREATISE ON LOGIC (10th ed. 1890).
124. LEVI HEDGE, ELEMENTS OF LOGICK; OR A SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND DIFFERENT MODES OF REASONING (1816); see FLOWER &
MURPHEY, supra note 123, at 373 (describing the history surrounding the use of
Hedges’ book). The course at Phillips Exeter used the same book as was used at
Harvard. See Letter from Shelley C. Bronk, supra note 122.
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Instead, it resembled what we would now call practical
reasoning or critical thinking. The logic course was taught
in the hope that Harvard graduates would internalize these
methods and one can see the success of this effort in the
writings of those they trained.125 Indeed, Hedge’s logic forms
a kind of rule book for mid-nineteenth century inquiry and
debate.
There are two ways in which Hedge’s account of
scientific method differs from modern accounts. The first
has to do with what Hedge describes as the involuntary
operations of the mind. There are two of these.126 The first is
the power to perceive the external world through the five
senses. The resulting perceptions are similar to what the
British empiricists called sense impressions. The second is
the power of introspection by which each person knows his
own internal emotional states. In both cases, the processes
are not subject to conscious control.127 This characteristic is
important. The things in consciousness that we do not
control are “reality”; that is, they are the very beliefs that
science and logic are meant to explain.128

125. One familiar with the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes or Charles
Peirce will recognize the influence of the book on their thinking.
126. Hedge calls the first operation perception and the second consciousness.
HEDGE, supra note 124, at 15-20.
127. Id. at 19. The incorrigibility of sense impressions is a common claim in
epistemology. Less common is the claim that the results of introspection are
similarly incorrigible, although you do find this claim made by philosophers
such as Descartes. Incorrigibility does not mean that I cannot be mistaken
about what is in the world or in consciousness, but simply that I am not
mistaken in reporting what I see. For example, while I cannot be incorrect in
reporting truthfully that I see a red balloon; I can still be convinced that the
balloon is not red if I am told that I am observing it through a red filter.
128. The reliability of internal states is much more controversial than the
reliability of perception, but it must be understood in the same way. It does not
mean that I cannot be mistaken in knowing that I am angry though I can admit
that I might not be if I knew all the facts. It is important to see how differently
we think about the emotional realm today. The account in Hedge presumes that
our emotional states are transparent; that at any given time we will know what
we are feeling. Id. at 20. This presupposition is just the opposite of how we think
about emotional states today. We are uncertain about our powers of
introspection. We believe in repressed feelings and unconscious drives, and
therefore believe that it takes of our feelings are repressed and that it therefore
takes real work to know what they are. All of this was missing in 1857 when
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A second difference with contemporary accounts of
science centers on what Hedge calls the voluntary
operations of the mind. Contemporary theories tend to focus
on observation and logical reasoning. Hedge, however,
points out the importance of certain other aspects of
cognition. These include:
1. Attention—the ability of the mind to focus on some
particular aspect of experience;129
2. Comparison—the mind’s ability to contemplate two
things with respect to one another;130
3. Abstraction—the ability to consider one particular
aspect of a thing while disregarding other aspects;131
4. Association—the ability of one idea in the mind to
call forth another;132
5. Analysis—the ability of the mind to separate out one
aspect of a compound subject and to focus on that aspect to
the exclusion of all others.133
Hedge’s focus on the voluntary operations means that
his conception of right method is only partially rooted in
right reasoning. Scientists must also be careful about how
they utilize their perceptions.
Modern philosophers of science tend to emphasize the
formal reasoning process, overlooking the ways in which
perceptions and feelings are processed by the mind. They
urge scientists to be accurate in their observations and
rigorous in their formal reasoning. Hedge, however,
emphasized that good science requires more. He writes:
Hedge wrote his Logick. For Hedge, feelings were like perceptions—our minds
reacted to things in the real world both in positive and negative ways. These
responses were not dismissed as somehow irrational. Rather they appeared to
be attached to the things that caused them in a way that let us know whether
these things were to be avoided or pursued.
129. Id. at 20-23.
130. Id. at 23-25.
131. Id. at 25-27.
132. Id. at 28-32.
133. Id. at 32-34.
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[I]f there be any thing that can be called genius in matters of mere
judgment and reasoning, it seems to consist chiefly in being able
to give that attention to the subject, which keeps it steady in the
mind, till we can survey it accurately on all sides. . . . the powers
of judging and reasoning depend chiefly on keeping the mind to a
clear and steady view of the subject. 134

Thus, the focus on the voluntary operations of the mind
helps us to see the difference between raw data and reliable
observation. It is not enough to be a passive receptor for
perceptions and feelings. One must also focus one’s
attention on individual aspects of experience, make
comparisons, and analyze one’s experiences into their
component parts.
These, then, are the two distinctive aspects of Hedge’s
philosophy of science. They have significant consequences
for legal science. Modern theorists tend to dismiss the idea
that we can study law as a natural science.135 The reason for
this is tied up with the distinction that is commonly made
between matters of fact and matters of value. Science, we
presuppose, is an inherently descriptive activity—all of its
findings are based upon observations of facts in the material
world. Law, on the other hand, is concerned not only with
the law as it is, but also with the law as it ought to be. It is
therefore an inherently normative activity; and, as such,
remains unrelated to physical observation. This, according
to current theories, means that the normative aspects of law
cannot be studied scientifically.136 Hedge, however, did not
share the assumption that there is a radical division
between fact and value. By privileging our feelings as well
as our perceptions, a science of value becomes possible. The
134. Id. at 20-21 (quoting THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF MAN
80 (1788)). Thomas Reid (1710-1796) was a Scottish logician whose work was
very influential with the logicians at Harvard. See FLOWER & MURPHEY, supra
note 123, at 245-54.
135. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
107-10 (1994).
136. Of course, legal positivism is consistent with this kind of scientific
positivism. Legal positivism reduces law to facts about what legislatures and
courts do. It is important to see, however, if we treat legal positivism as a
science, that is, if we try to make predictions on the basis of observing courts
and legislatures, it is necessary make assumptions about the normative
commitments of certain actors. In any case, when Langdell called law a science,
this kind of positivistic science was not what he had in mind.
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feeling that some result is both fair and just counts as
evidence that it is so in the same way that the sensation of
red is evidence of a red object. Of course it is possible that
something may appear red even though it isn’t. In the same
way, something may feel fair and just, but still not be so.
That is why the voluntary operations of the mind are so
important. In this connection, Hedge writes:
Without [analysis], our perceptive powers would give us only
confused and imperfect notions of the objects around us. . . .
Nature dictates this process. . . . The objects, which nature
presents to us, consist of assemblages of different qualities, some
more and others less easily distinguished. . . . Things, which have
no immediate reference to material objects, such as thoughts,
affections, and mental operations, are analyzed in the same
manner, as objects of sense. . . . The same may be said of moral
qualities, as justice, prudence, benevolence, and the like. 137

Thus, with both facts and values, it is important to
think critically about the perceptions and feelings one
experiences. One can ask: “Is this object really red or am I
seeing it through a red filter?” Equally, one can ask: “Is this
outcome really just? Would I feel it to be so if I were the
plaintiff or the defendant?”
As a result of Hedge’s influence, Harvard students were
led to organize their thoughts in a particular way. The raw
material of any inquiry consisted of the things described as
intuitive evidence—what we see, hear, and feel. The next
step involved cleaning up the raw material by subjecting it
to thorough inspection and analysis. The final step was
logic. Inferences could be drawn in accordance with a
number of approved methods. These included deduction,
induction, analogy, probability theory, and “reasoning from
facts.”138

137. HEDGE, supra note 124, at 32-34.
138. The last category is particularly interesting to lawyers. It is a description
of principles that can be used to analyze bits of evidence and testimony in order
to determine the true fact of the matter. Examples of these principles are:
 We rely upon the assertions of others. Id. at 108.
 Written testimony is better than oral testimony. Id. at 114.
 General notoriety is a ground for belief. Id. at 117.
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One should note that this is a very loose conception of
scientific method. There is no canonical form of inquiry.
Whether the inquiry is descriptive or normative, rational
inquirers were urged to use whatever techniques suited
their subject matters. This diversity of method, however,
does not prevent us from further analyzing the method that
regulated the formulation of Langdell’s theory. Indeed,
Hedge makes a number of distinctions that are helpful in
this process. The first is a distinction between the
demonstrative method used in mathematics and other less
formal methods of reasoning.139 In the next section (Part
III.B), I will use this distinction to consider the common
claim that Langdell modeled his legal analysis on the
deductive methods of geometry. A second distinction is
between an analytic method that aims primarily at
classification and a synthetic method that adopts an
explanatory hypothesis to account for observed data. In this
context, I will address the claim that Langdell’s project is
primarily one of classification (Part III.C).
B. Langdell’s Theory as Demonstrative Reasoning
It is commonly thought that Langdell utilized a logical
method similar to that used in geometry or mathematics.
There are a number of reasons why this view is so
widespread. First, there is Holmes’ review140 of Langdell’s
 Circumstantial evidence is reliable when there is enough so that
they cannot be accounted for in any way except by supposing the truth
in question. Id. at 120.
 Exceptional facts need much testimony. Id. at 123-24.
139. Hedge describes two types of reasoning—demonstrative reasoning and
moral reasoning. He defines the first—“demonstrative reasoning”—as reasoning
that “is employed about abstract and independent truths, or those relations,
which are considered as necessary, and whose subjects may be exactly measured
and defined.” Id. at 84-85. The second—“moral reasoning”—includes all forms of
correct reasoning that is not demonstrative. Id. at 83-84. It is important to note
that the term “moral” reasoning is misleading. It is not limited to normative
reasoning such as practical syllogisms and deontic logic. It includes not only
these, but also the methods of science—be it the classificatory method of the life
sciences or the predictive method of the physical sciences. Id. at 85-86. In fact,
Hedge’s notion of moral reasoning is what we might today refer to as applied
reasoning, and to avoid confusion, from here on out, I will refer to this second
type of reasoning as “applied reasoning.”
140. Holmes, supra note 114, at 233-34.
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Summary. The review, in typical Holmes fashion, rings with
memorable phrases. For example Holmes accuses Langdell
of being “the greatest living legal theologian,” and sums up
his disagreement with Langdell with the oft-quoted
statement: “The life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience.”141 These words were fatal for Langdell.
They lie at the heart of the realist movement that saw
Holmes as a far-sighted realist and Langdell as an oldfashioned formalist. This led to a picture of Langdell as one
who equated law with an internal logic that remained
unaffected by world events. Notwithstanding the stereotype
of Langdell as a formalist, there is no quicker way to
misunderstand his theory than to assume that he is
engaged in creating a logical system. To illustrate the point,
we might take a careful look at Hedge’s description of
demonstrative reasoning.142 Demonstrative reasoning, in
Hedge’s terms, is a closed deductive system of the kind
utilized in mathematics.143 It begins with a fixed number of
141. Id. at 234.
142. In talking about the nature of mathematical reasoning,
terminology and the description given by Hedge. It should be
that there is nothing unusual about Hedge’s account. It more
what we understand about such studies today. It is also fairly
the view of mainstream experts in mathematical logic.

I am using the
noted, however
or less mirrors
consistent with

143. The distinction between demonstrative reasoning and applied reasoning
is further described by Hedge by noting six differences between them: the
following table is constructed from Hedge’s text. See HEDGE, supra note 124, at
84-89.
Demonstrative Reasoning

Applied Reasoning

About abstract matters that can
be precisely measured.

About matters of fact; things that are
contingent.

It leaves the reasoner with a
definite conclusion.

May have arguments of weight on both
sides and therefore the result may be
regarded as uncertain or tentative.

The opposite of its conclusion is
absurd.

The opposite of its conclusion is
considered false.

Its conclusion is certain.

Its conclusion is only probable.

Its conclusion is supported by a
single thread of argument where
each step has an intuitive
connection to what went before.

Its conclusion may be supported by a
number of independent arguments
each one of which adds weight to the
conclusion.
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clear and precise axioms which are intuitively obvious to
all.144 It then proceeds solely by means of deductive
arguments. It is this combination—incontrovertible
premises and a deductive method—that gives mathematical
truths their timeless, universal, and necessary character. If
one were to apply such a method to law, then each legal
case: (1) would have one and only one right answer; and (2)
the answer would be correct for all time and under all
circumstances. To determine whether Langdell is using
such a method, we should apply these criteria to what we
have learned about his theory.
Langdell’s theory is different from a demonstrative
argument in a number of ways. First his premises are not
intuitively obvious. They are, by his own account, derived
from the cases, and even for someone who has closely read
the cases there is nothing obvious about them.145
Furthermore, his theory is built upon more than deductive
reasoning. One cannot, for example, deduce his conclusion
—offer and acceptance are required for the formation of a
contract—from the rule most commonly found in the cases—
one side cannot be bound unless the other side is. In
addition, even Langdell does not believe that the results of
his theory are timeless, universal and independent of
circumstances. If he did believe this, he would not offer so
much explanation and justification for the results in
particular cases. Finally, the notion of the Summary as an
instance of demonstrative reasoning is hard to square with
Langdell’s own humility about his enterprise. Certainly, if
he believed that he had succeeded in reducing contract law
to a logical system, he would not have published it solely as
a teaching aid for students. Indeed, in explaining why he
has called the work a summary, he states that “it has at

Chief problem is finding the
intermediate steps to construct a
proof.

Chief problem is the lack of exact
definitions to our words and the
difficulty of keeping the factual context
steadily in view.

144. Id. at 84-85.
145. See Holmes, supra note 108, at 233-34.
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least the recommendation of not leading the reader to
expect too much[.]”146
There is one variation on the theme of Langdell as a
legal logician that deserves special consideration. Thomas
Grey, in an article entitled Langdell’s Orthodoxy,147 argues
that Langdell’s system resembles mathematics only if one
thinks about mathematics in the empirical terms suggested
by John Stuart Mill. Mill believed that the truths of
mathematics were empirical generalizations.148 For
example, he thought that one knew that 2 + 2 = 4 because
every time we counted two things and two more things we
ended up with four. Grey thought that Langdell intended a
similar process to be undertaken by his students: they
would read the cases, select the rules, and generalize to a
collection of rules that formed the basis of contract law.149
Grey makes the sensible point that if Langdell had been
committed to deriving his theory from intuitively obvious
first principles, then students would not have been expected
to extract the principle from the cases.150 This use of an
empirical model of mathematics permits Grey to explain
why it is that the principles had to be gleaned from the
cases and, at the same time, to argue that Langdell was a
formalist in all the ways that count, i.e., that he claimed
universality and certainty for his mathematical
conclusions.151 Grey’s description, however, hardly matches
what we have seen of Langdell’s theory and the cases that
support it. In particular, we have seen that the theory
contains principles that are not enumerable from those
articulated in the cases. Arriving at Langdell’s conclusion
requires more than just observing and counting. As we shall
see in the next section, the creation of a freestanding theory
is an essential part of his enterprise.
146. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at iv.
147. Grey, supra note 7, at 19.
148. MILL, supra note 119, at 147.
149. Grey, supra note 7, at 20.
150. Id.
151. The empirical model portrays the first principles of mathematics as
empirical generalizations about the world. The resulting mathematical
conclusions are relatively certain—they are correct so long as the relatively
simple observations are done correctly.
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C. Langdell’s Theory as a Classificatory System
Hedge makes another distinction that is useful in trying
to analyze Langdell’s method. This is the distinction
between analysis and synthesis.152 An analytic method is
one in which a compound subject is reduced to its
elementary parts. For example, if I want to analyze the
concept of a unicorn, I might divide it into (1) a horse like
creature and (2) the existence of one horn coming from its
forehead. On the other hand, a synthetic method is one that
brings certain unlike things together. For example,
conceiving of both a robin and a blue jay, I can synthesize
these conceptions into the concept of a bird. This synthesis
will require a certain amount of analysis. I must analyze
each concept to find out what they have in common and
then use this to define the more general concept. For Hedge,
the important difference between analysis and synthesis is
their different functions.153 Analysis is essential if we are
trying to increase our store of knowledge and synthesis is
useful in conveying knowledge previously achieved. For
students, synthesis can be an aid to comprehension and
memory.
When these methods are applied to observational
sciences, there are important differences between them.
With analysis, each observation is broken down into its
constituent parts. Therefore, each statement that is made
will be descriptive; that is, each term in such a statement
will describe some aspect of the observation. For example, I
see a robin. I note that a distinguishing feature of the robin
is its red breast. The term “red breast” is descriptive in the
sense that it refers to a property of the thing that is
observed. On the other hand, if I am using a synthetic
method, I might categorize the robin as “something we saw
on our walk today.” Such a categorization might be useful if
I am trying to teach my daughter what a robin is. Or, when
added to the rabbit and the deer that we also saw today, it
152. This distinction is similar to Kant’s distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments. For Kant, an analytic judgment is one that breaks a
concept down into its constituent parts. For example, all bachelors are
unmarried. On the other hand, Hedge is using these terms to describe not just
statements but a method. For example, an analytic method is one that focuses
on a single conception and lays out its constituent parts.
153. HEDGE, supra note 124, at 190-91.
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might be used to help her learn the concept of “animals that
are not pets.” The important thing about the synthetic
method is that, by its very nature, it must introduce
concepts that are not directly present in the observations
themselves. This is one reason why we must regard
Langdell’s work as synthetic in nature.
The fact that Langdell’s theory is a synthetic theory is
very important because it helps us to locate the theory
within the context of mid-nineteenth century theorizing. In
this context, Howard Schweber’s paper, The “Science” of
Legal Science: the Model of the Natural Sciences in
Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education,154 is
extremely helpful. Schweber distinguishes between the
group of scientists that were active in the period before the
Civil War, and a second generation that were active after
the Civil War. The pre-war group included Alexander
Bache,155 Benjamin Peirce,156 Louis Agassiz,157 and others.158
They espoused what Schweber calls “Protestant Baconism,”
a theory marked by four distinctive characteristics:
1. A commitment to natural theology;
2. A taxonomic view of science;
3. A belief in the unity of science; and
4. A faith that public science would produce “moral and
political uplift.”159

154. Schweber, supra note 7, at 421.
155. Alexander Dallas Bache (1806-1867), Superintendent of the U.S. Coastal
Survey (1843-1867), great-grandson of Benjamin Franklin.
156. Benjamin Peirce (1809-1880), Harvard mathematician and father of
Charles Peirce.
157. Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), Harvard geologist and paleontologist who did
much to establish Harvard as a world-class university. For more information
generally about these men, see JOSEPH BRENT, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: A LIFE
29 (1998); EDWARD LURIE, LOUIS AGASSIZ: A LIFE IN SCIENCE (1960); and HUGH
RICHARD SLOTTEN, PATRONAGE, PRACTICE, AND THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN
SCIENCE: ALEXANDER DALLAS BACHE AND THE U.S. COAST SURVEY (1994).
158. Schweber mentions Joseph Henry, James Dana, Oliver Gibbs, John
Frazier, and Benjamin Gould. Schweber, supra note 7, at 425.
159. Id. at 423.
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Agassiz was a good example of “Protestant Baconism” in
action. Agassiz’s particular gift was his ability to motivate
ordinary people to become investigators on his behalf. He
would organize field trips and local clubs to scour the
countryside for fossils and geological formations. He
believed that the study of nature was the study of God.
Since God created life, he reasoned, understanding God
meant surveying the forms of life that he created.
Furthermore, he believed that organizing the samples into
classes, species, and genres would generate an insight into
the nature of God’s intellect.160
The second generation identified by Schweber followed
the Civil War and was typified by botanist Asa Gray whom
Schweber describes as “presid[ing] over an institutional
turning inward that emphasized internalist discourse,
disassociation from public affairs, a rejection of theological
and political implications alike, and an emphasis on the
value of theoretical rather than practical scientific
understanding and on the construction of explanatory
theories rather than taxonomies.”161
This second generation was not content to simply
catalogue their observations. They were motivated by a
desire to do grand theory. Key to their method was the
formulation of explanatory hypotheses that not only
explained past observations but could predict future ones.
This second generation included men like Charles Peirce,
William James, Chauncey Wright, and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.162
The question for Schweber is whether Langdell’s theory
is an instance of Protestant Baconism or whether it is the
kind of explanatory theory that represents the method of
the post-war generation? Schweber argues for the first
alternative. In doing so, he characterizes Langdell’s theory
in ways that seem, given the above analysis of Langdell’s
theory, clearly mistaken. For example, Schweber states that
Langdell “retained the constrained inductivism” of
Protestant Baconism because “his students would reason by
160. LURIE, supra note 157, at 58-62.
161. Schweber, supra note 7, at 456.
162. It was members of the second generation who founded The Metaphysical
Club described the book by LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001).
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inference to already-determined principles, set out in
summaries.”163 As we have seen, however, the theory
contained in the Summary is not an inductive
generalization of the principles already contained in the
cases. In another place, Schweber argues that “Langdell
drew his students’ attention only to those few cases that he
knew to be accurate and clear demonstrations of principles
known to him to be correct[,]”164 but we have seen that, from
Langdell’s point of view, many of the cases in the Casebook
are misleading or incorrect. Langdell may be, in many ways,
a holdover from the earlier generation, but one thing is
certain. Langdell’s theory is no mere classification of the
principles put forward in the cases.
In Schweber’s defense, there are a number of reasons
why it seems natural to place Langdell in the earlier
generation of Protestant Baconists. First, Langdell’s age is
closer to that generation than to the later one. Second,
Hedge’s Logick, from which Langdell learned about
scientific method, was at the heart of Protestant Baconism.
Finally, Langdell’s “fuddy-duddy” image is hardly consistent
with his placement at the forefront of methodological
innovation. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the actual
theory articulated by Langdell is an instance of the
predictive methodology utilized by the post-war generation,
and this should not be a surprise given certain additional
facts. First, Langdell was not an academic of the old school.
He had spent years practicing law in New York and only
returned to Cambridge after the Civil War in 1870.165 This
was exactly the time when the post-war generation was
developing its views.166 Secondly, a man who had been
educated under the influence of Hedge’s Logick knew that,
while analysis was the method of science, synthesis was the
method by which science should be taught. Teaching was, of
course, exactly the enterprise in which Langdell was

163. Schweber, supra note 7, at 459.
164. Id.
165. Bruce A. Kimball & R. Blake Brown, “The Highest Legal Ability in the
Nation”: Langdell on Wall Street, 1855-1870, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39 (2004).
166. The Metaphysical Club started meeting in 1872, and, given that Langdell
shared rooms with Chauncey Wright, it is certain that he was aware of their
views. Kimball, supra note 1, at 215-16.
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engaged. The Casebook and the Summary are both the
product of the following set of circumstances:
Now, however, I was called upon to consider directly the subject
of teaching, not theoretically but practically, in connection with a
large school . . . . To accomplish this successfully, it was necessary,
first, that the efforts of the pupils should go hand in hand with
mine, that is, that they should study with direct reference to my
instruction; secondly, that the study thus required of them should
be of the kind from which they might reap the greatest and most
lasting benefit; thirdly, that the instruction should be of such a
character that the pupils might at least derive a greater
advantage from attending it than from devoting the same time to
private study.167

Langdell was first and foremost a teacher of law. It was
as a teacher that he proposed his theory. The theory is
therefore synthetic—it provides a way of understanding the
cases as well as a way of recommending outcomes for future
cases. If much about his modes of expression seem old
fashioned, this one thing was not. Langdell’s theory
represented a methodological innovation that would become
the mainstay for legal education for many years to come.
D. Langdell’s Theory as Predictive Science
Having argued that Langdell’s theory is synthetic in
Hedge’s terms, it would be helpful to understand exactly
what this means. Unfortunately, in this connection, Hedge
is little help. While Hedge characterizes synthetic theories
as providing a general explanation, he does not say much
about the kind of explanation they offer. To understand this
issue, we need to look not at Hedge, whose book was
published in 1816, but to a logic book published by Francis
Bowen in 1864.168 By 1880, when Langdell published his
Summary, Bowen’s book was in wide use and had
supplanted Hedge’s as the required logic text at Harvard.
Just as Hedge’s book had provided guidance for the pre-war
generation of scientists; it was Bowen who taught the postwar generation. Under Bowen’s influence, this second
generation was quickly assimilating the use of explanatory

167. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at vii.
168. BOWEN, supra note 123.
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hypotheses.169 Since we have seen that Langdell is
propounding such a theory, it is to Bowen’s book that we
must look for an explanation of how such theories work.
Bowen’s text includes a full discussion of synthetic
theories. In the course of this discussion, he describes three
ways in which our scientific knowledge becomes more
general. The three types of generalization are: (1) A General
Fact, (2) A Law of Nature, and (3) A Physical Cause.170
Looking at the first two of these will give us a better
understanding of Langdell’s theory.171
A General Fact is the result of an induction by simple
enumeration. Bowen’s examples include:
 All horned animals are ruminant;
 All quadrupeds are viviparous;
 Every living thing is produced from an egg; and
 Alcohol and opium intoxicate.172
A General Fact asserts a relationship between subject
and predicate that is true of all observed cases.173
A Law of Nature is what Bowen describes as a “second
order induction.”174 It is similar to a General Fact, but it
169. See, e.g., O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-61
(1897); infra note 178.
170. BOWEN, supra note 123, at 405.
171. Bowen’s discussion of the third type of generalization portrays a physical
cause as something even more general than a Law of Nature, “bearing the same
relation to a Law of Nature, that such a Law bears to a General Fact.” Id. at
413. Utilizing Bowen’s distinction between Laws of Nature and Physical Causes
would lead us far afield into the area of nineteenth-century metaphysics and is
not necessary to the analysis of Langdell.
172. Id. at 405.
173. Id. at 413.
174. Id. at 406. Bowen uses both terms—Law of Nature and second order
induction—to describe the use of explanatory hypotheses. In this context, I
prefer the latter since the term Law of Nature is a little misleading. There are
obviously differences between what we generally understand to be a law of
nature and the law as it is practiced by the courts. Bowen’s use of term,
however, is technical as he uses it to refer solely to those generalizations that
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asserts that a certain relationship “must hold true on all
occasions.” This means that it applies not only to all
observed cases, but also to all similar cases that may be
observed in the future. Indeed, the presence of even one
non-conforming case means that the second order induction
is false. Furthermore, a second order induction has more
generality than a simple General Fact:
A Law of Nature [or second order induction], in its more definite
signification, is employed to designate a group or series of General
Facts, relating to the same subject or class of subjects, and
differing from each other by some mode of proportional variation,
so that the place of every member of the series may be easily
deduced from one numerical formula.175

Thus, a second order induction does more than simply
add up the properties of a group of individuals. We may
have observed, for example, that a marble always rolls down
Incline A in four seconds and that it always rolls down
Incline B in six. Each of these is a general fact because it is
the result of generalizing over a number of actual
measurements. A second order induction is more general. It
might give us a formula for determining how fast an object
will descend an incline no matter what incline is used. For
example, in a frictionless world, it would relate the time
elapsed to the weight of the object and the length and angle
of the incline. These inductions cannot be discovered by
mere calculation. As Bowen writes:
The process of hunting for a Law of Nature [or second order
induction] amid a group of General Facts is essentially tentative,
resembling an attempt to find the meaning of a riddle; we try one
guess after another, and at last stumble upon the right one when
we least expected it. Success is usually obtained, not by trying to
extend the survey, or to contemplate the largest possible number
of cases, but by restricting the field of search to a few well-chosen
instances, and attempting to find a pattern or construction which
these few will precisely fit.176

are made not by enumeration but by considering patterns in observed facts. See,
e.g., id. at 308, 345, 406.
175. Id. at 406.
176. Id. at 409-10.
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It is clear that Langdell’s theory should be analogized to
a second order induction.177 This should not surprise us. By
1880, it must have been clear that no simple inductive
theory could bring order to contract law. For example, we
have seen that Kent acknowledged the need for general
rules; but, at the same time, was unable to find any.178 We
have also seen that, as contract law became more complex,
Parsons was only able to describe it in a lengthy and
confusing text.179 General facts had simply failed to organize
the material. Like physics, contract law needed grand
theory; that is, it needed to invent new concepts that would
explain individual outcomes.
The notion that Langdell was propounding something
like a second order inductive theory is supported by a
number of striking similarities between Bowen’s text and
Langdell’s description of the case method. One such
similarity is apparent when we compare Langdell to
Blackstone. Blackstone describes contract law by reciting
certain General Facts. For example, one such fact is: if a
buyer leaves the seller’s place of business without leaving a
deposit, the courts will not find an enforceable contract.180
Langdell, by contrast, is not content with simply
enumerating such facts. He is looking for something that
“must hold true on all occasions”:181 “Law, considered as a
science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have
such a mastery of these as to be able to aply them with

177. Bowen’s focus on physical laws leads him to describe second order
inductions in terms of proportionality and mathematical formulas. Strictly
speaking, then, Langdell’s theory would not fit into this category. Nevertheless,
as the text argues, there are enough similarities to make a sound analogy
between Langdell’s theory and second order induction. Furthermore, Charles
Peirce whose work in logic succeeded Bowen’s coined the term “Abduction” to
describe reasoning that posited an explanatory hypothesis from which observed
facts could be deduced. Langdell’s method would count as abductive and what I
write here about second order inductions is equally true of abduction. See
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, Lecture VII: Pragmatism and Abduction, in 5
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 112, 112-14 (Charles Hartshorne
& Paul Weiss eds., Belknap Press 1965) (1934).
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. See supra Part I.C.
180. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 447.
181. BOWEN, supra note 123, at 405.
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constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of
human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer[.]”182
We can also see a similarity between Bowen and
Langdell in their insistence that increased generality is not
obtained by surveying increasing numbers of individual
cases. Bowen speaks of the necessity of “restricting the field
of search to a few well-chosen instances,”183 while Langdell
instructs:
This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of cases;
and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering
the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is
embodied. But the cases which are useful and necessary for this
purpose at the present day bear an exceedingly small proportion
to all that have been reported.184

Finally, there is the fact that Langdell’s theory uses
terms and concepts that are not contained in the cases
themselves. We can see from Bowen’s description that this
is a particular characteristic of second order inductions. We
can formulate General Facts without changing our
vocabulary, but a second order induction requires that we
find something in common between two states of affairs that
is not contained in a simple empirical report. For example,
two marbles are subject to the law of gravity even though
one can examine them closely and never see such a force.
We obtain such a concept only by creating it to explain
observed behavior. Similarly, one can look at the preLangdell contracts case law in vain for any hint that there
is a distinction to be made between an offer and an
acceptance. It is only Langdell’s creative power that
supplies such a concept, and the test of this concept is
whether it in fact predicts future events.
We can achieve additional clarity about Langdell’s
method by comparing it to the notion of “abduction” as that
term is used by Charles Peirce.185 Like second order
182. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at viii.
183. BOWEN, supra note 123, at 410.
184. LANGDELL, CASEBOOK, supra note 61, at viii.
185. Charles Peirce was in fact barely fifteen years younger than Langdell. His
work in logic, however, was ahead of its time and he had a particular influence
on later philosophers of science such as Karl Popper, W. V. O. Quine, and Hilary
Putnam.
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inductions, an abduction formulates a general hypothesis
from which the observed facts can be deduced. For example,
Newton’s laws represent an abductive inference. The laws
themselves can never be deduced from observed phenomena.
Rather the laws, if we suppose them to be true, entail
observed phenomena. In short, predictions about how
physical objects will behave are deducible from the laws
themselves. This is why abduction is the “only logical
operation which introduces any new idea.”186 It can bring in a
new idea precisely because it is not derived from the
observations themselves. One can make up an abductive
conclusion out of whole cloth. Obviously, then, the assertion of
an abduction does not make it true. It only furnishes a
suggestion that can be tested by comparison with particular
cases. Thus, Peirce writes about the justification of abduction
as follows:
Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can
draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we
are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it
must be by abduction that this is to be brought about.
No reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I can
discover; and it needs no reason since it merely offers
suggestions.187

Note that Langdell’s theory meets all of the
requirements for an abductive theory. It formulates a
general theory; it adds new terms to the analysis; and it is
tested by comparison to predictions about future legal cases.
This description of abduction and of synthetic theories
generally leaves us with a clear direction as to where we
should look for justification of Langdell’s theory. We can
view Langdell’s theory as correct so long as the results that
it entails for individual cases match the real world results of
those cases. However, with law, the question of prediction is
a peculiar one. Does it mean predicting what the court will
do or what it should do? If the latter, how can such a
normative hypothesis be justified? These are questions that
will be addressed in the next section.
186. CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, Lecture VI: Three Types of Reasoning, in 5
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, supra note 177, at 94, 106.
187. Id.
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Conclusion and Summary to Part III
Langdell’s innovation comes down to this: to do legal
science, it is not enough to organize, compile, and classify
legal authority; it is also necessary to theorize. Legal
theories are made in the same way that theories are made
in empirical science.
In empirical science, the scientist formulates a theory
that explains the observed facts. The explanation may use
abstract terms and concepts, such as “force” or
“temperature,” which are not immediately present in the
observed phenomena. An empirical theory explains the
observed data if the observed data is deducible from the
theory itself. So long as the theory accurately predicts
observed phenomena, the scientist is justified in believing
the theory to be true and using it as the basis for further
experiments.
In legal science, likewise, the theorist formulates a
theory that explains the existing legal cases. Again, the
theory may use abstract terms and concepts that are not
used in the cases themselves. A legal theory explains the
cases if: (1) it entails a non-ambiguous result for each of the
legal questions it covers; and (2) the result that it mandates
in each individual case is the right result. In law, the
determination of a “right” result presents particular
problems of justification, and these will be considered in the
next part.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFICATION
In the last part, I argued that Langdell’s theory is
predictive in the sense that it provides a general
explanation of contract law from which specific results in
individual cases can be derived. I have also argued that the
idea of a predictive doctrinal theory for contract law is
original with Langdell. In this part, I turn to the question of
justification. The discussion has two parts. First, there is
the question of how Langdell thought about justification.
Why did he think that his theory was correct? How would
he know whether he had hit upon the right explanation for
the development of contract law? I will address these
questions in Part IV.A. The second section (IV.B) addresses
more contemporary concerns. What is the nature of a
doctrinal theory, and what, for us, justifies its use? It is
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important to ask this second question because Langdell
wrote over a century ago; and, in that time, our ideas about
scientific method and the nature of justification have
changed.
A. Justifying Langdell’s Theory
I concluded in the last part that Langdell’s goal was to
formulate a synthetic and predictive theory. It follows that
the question of justification is entirely a matter of the
accuracy of its predictions. At this point, one is tempted to
throw up one’s hands and say that Langdell’s theory is
false. After all, we have seen that it is at variance with the
outcomes of a number of cases.188 This would be fatal indeed
if the point of the theory were to predict the actual outcome
of legal cases. However, I do not think that this was
Langdell’s purpose. To show this, we would do well to
contrast Langdell’s predictive theory with the predictive
theory that was advocated by Holmes in The Path of the
Law.189 Holmes argues that the point of learning law is to
predict what courts will do in fact,190 and I think it is
obvious to anyone who thinks about it, that such predictions
could not be made solely on the basis of doctrinal
arguments. Even a first year law student knows that courts
do not always follow the most recent formulations of legal
doctrine. Courts sometimes change the law, or
misunderstand the law, or apply some different part of the
law, or find an exception to the law, or simply ignore the
law because it does not make sense in a particular case. A
Holmesian prediction must take account of all these
possibilities. A Langdellian prediction, on the other hand,
will be something simpler. It cannot, however, be too
simple. For example, it would be question-begging to say,
that Langdellian legal doctrine simply predicts what legal
doctrine will recommend for the decision of a case. Instead, I
think that Langdell is offering a genuine jurisprudential
theory. It is the point of his theory, I believe, to predict what
would be the right answer for each case that the theory
covers.
188. See LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 18-22.
189. Holmes, supra note 169.
190. Id. at 457. (“The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of
the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.”).
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This raises the question: how can we determine whether
the result Langdell predicts is really the right result for the
individual case? To answer this, we must return to the
epistemological analysis offered by Hedge. Hedge, it will be
recalled, believed that we have intuitions about morality
and justice just as we have intuitions about physical
reality.191 We feel that some particular thing is good or just
in the same way that we see that a particular physical
object is red or round. This is why it is so necessary for law
students to study legal cases. In learning the law, students
should not be content to simply know what the court did in
a particular case. They also need to discern whether the
case was correctly decided. To do this, they consult not just
the doctrine but their own feelings of justice. This enables
them to infer the legal rule—a rule that is not based on
what the court did but about their own intuitions of what
the court should have done in that particular case.
Note that the basis of the above described process is
that a student can, as Hedge asserts, determine what the
outcome should be for a particular case. This permits the
student both to make the appropriate inferences and, once
the explanatory hypothesis is obtained, to compare its
predictions with the individual cases. If the prediction
matches the preferred outcome, then the theory is
confirmed. If not, the theory must be abandoned or changed.
This is why the issue about the mailbox rule is so important
to Langdell. On the one hand, Langdell asserts that is
irrelevant if the mailbox rule serves justice and convenience
of the parties. That means that if his theory is correct, then
arguments about justice and convenience are irrelevant. If,
on the other hand, one wonders whether the theory is
correct—i.e. whether it has predicted the correct result in
the mailbox case—then justice and convenience—or at least
our feelings about justice are the name of the game. He is
therefore particularly concerned to show that the
arguments in support of the mailbox rule are erroneous. He
argues:
The only cases of real hardship are where there is a miscarriage of
the letter of acceptance, and in those cases a hardship to one of
the parties is inevitable. Adopting one view, the hardship consists
in making one liable on a contract which he is ignorant of having
191. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
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made; adopting the other view, it consists in depriving one of the
benefit of a contract he supposes he has made. Between these two
evils the choice would seem to be clear: the former is positive, the
latter merely negative; the former imposes a liability to which no
limit can be placed, the latter leaves everything in statu quo.192

This defense of his position raises two questions. First,
what is the relationship between the arguments that
Langdell gives in this case and the “feelings” of justice upon
which the decision of the issue must rest. The second
question relates to jurisprudence. We have paired two
things—the outcome predicted by the theory and what is
felt to be the just outcome. If these two things are always
the same (as they must be if Langdell’s theory is correct)
then why do we need the theory? Why shouldn’t everyone—
student, lawyer, and judge—simply assume that each case
must be decided in terms of what is felt to be just? This is a
good question and a serious one for Langdell’s theory.193
We can begin to answer these questions by paying
careful attention to the arguments that he makes about the
mailbox case. In his mind, the question is not simply
whether it is or is not just for the plaintiff to win. Rather, he
begins by looking at the matter from the viewpoint of each
of the parties.194 This ensures that he does not reach a result
that is blind to the interests of either. Having done this, he
argues that either ruling will defeat the rightful
expectations of one of the parties. This argument essentially
places both parties on a par in terms of potential injury.
Which party, he asks, will be more unjustly harmed by an
192. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 21.
193. It is worth noting that this is a problem for any normative jurisprudential
theory. On the one hand, we cannot verify a normatively predictive theory
unless we have some way of determining the correct decision in the individual
case. Since we cannot simply appeal to our original theory, we will need a
method—call it method #2—to decide the question. On the other hand, if
method #2 is available to decide the case, why don’t we simply use it instead of
the jurisprudential theory? The only way in the normative theory could be of
any use is if it were somehow simpler than method #2. As I argue in the text,
this objection can only be resolved if we recognize that such theories have a
dialectical element.
194. LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 21 (“Adopting one view, the
hardship consists in making one liable on a contract which he is ignorant of
having made; adopting the other view, it consists in depriving one of the benefit
of a contract he supposes he has made.”).
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unfavorable outcome? This, he weighs, by characterizing a
failure to enforce the contract as the “status quo” and an
enforcement of the contract as “impos[ing] a liability to
which no limit can be placed.”195 Essentially, this argument
reframes the situation that obtains between the parties.196
Thus what was once a question of two innocent parties
being disadvantaged by the vagaries of the mail service
becomes a choice between maintaining the status quo and
imposing unlimited liability on one of the parties. By
reframing the issue, Langdell hopes to succeed in swaying
the reader’s feelings in a way that favors the defendant.
This argument demonstrates an important point about
our feelings of justice. These feelings are not static. We may
have, as Hedge argues, an innate sense of justice which
leads us to regard some outcomes with approval and others
with disapproval.197 Our feelings, however, are shaped not
only by our perception of the situation, but also by the way
in which we characterize and interpret it. We may
empathize with one of the parties. We may have
background assumptions that provide a context. We may
see the situation in terms of one normative principle or
another to which we have a preexisting commitment.
Langdell’s argument works on this principle. By
195. Id. (“Between these two evils the choice would seem to be clear: the
former is positive, the latter merely negative; the former imposes a liability to
which no limit can be placed, the latter leaves everything in statu quo.”).
196. I argue that Langdell is reframing the issue. An alternative
interpretation is that he offering an independent abstract argument favoring
the plaintiff. If this is true, it is hard to know what to make of his argument.
Either it is a utilitarian argument based on the idea that it is less onerous to
leave the status quo in place or he is simply asserting a normative principle that
changes in the status quo are always less just than preserving the status quo. If
it is a utilitarian argument, he has the problem—one that is shared by all rule
utilitarians—that, by assuming that his rule is less onerous in general, he paves
the way for particular outcomes that are, in fact, more onerous. (One example
would be where a starving buyer loses his opportunity to buy the last morsel of
food, while the rich seller gains a small increment on price by selling to a third
party). Thus, it could happen, as an empirical matter, that enforcing the rule
leads to less utility in the long run. On the other hand, the normative principle
interpretation is even more troublesome. Is there something about the status
quo that makes it more fair and just than changes in the status quo? Is it
obvious to all that Robin Hood was behaving unjustly in stealing from the rich
and giving to the poor?
197. See supra note 126-27 and accompanying text.
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reformulating the situation, he hopes to evoke a particular
emotional response. Langdell’s contract theory does
precisely this. It provides a manner of interpreting the
situation that channels a normative response. This way of
understanding Langdell’s argument answers the first
question—what is the relationship between his argument
and feelings about justice? It also makes a start on the
second—why isn’t jurisprudence simply a matter of
consulting one’s feelings about the justice of a case?
Once we recognize that one’s feelings about the justice
of a given case are not static, we can see that a
jurisprudence based upon such feelings must be highly
ambiguous. Should the judge simply decide in accordance
with his or her first feelings about a case? Or should there
be some process by which these feelings are allowed to
develop? Obviously this is a complicated question and one
that I will not answer in this Article. I offer, however, a
partial answer that makes sense in the context of Langdell’s
theory. It appears to me that a doctrinal theory such as
Langdell’s does not work by providing more rules or more
specific rules. Rather it works by providing a context within
which the rules operate. Mutuality may be the age old
principle of contract law, but it is not until Langdell applies
this rule to a more richly described analysis of contract
formation that the rule becomes more determinate. The
point of such a doctrinal theory is to force all those who read
the case to characterize the facts in the same way. This is
turn produces a higher degree of consensus about the
desired outcome. Thus there is a distinction to be made
between feelings of justice that are prompted by a “raw”
description of a case and those that are prompted when the
case is described in doctrinal terms. If we assume that
Langdell is interested in the second possibility, then the
point of his theory is to provide a canonical way of
characterizing the facts. Keeping this in mind, we can be
specific about the kind of confirmation that Langdell’s
theory requires. What is required is that the theory give a
definite answer to each legal case that it addresses and that
the answer it gives, described in doctrinal terms, does not
provoke feelings of disapproval and injustice. There is
circularity about this justification, but it is a circularity that
is shared by all scientific theories—one needs the theory in
order to measure the confirming instances of the theory. It
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is this circularity that has led modern philosophers of
science to think in more pragmatic terms,198 and so in the
next section, I will consider the problem of doctrinal
theories in this more modern context.
B. The Value of Legal Doctrine
In this section we leave Langdell behind and address
the question of doctrine from a more modern perspective. I
said in the beginning that my interest in Langdell was
caused in part by my recognition that doctrine was an
important part of legal analysis. Seeing Langdell as the
inventor of legal doctrine piqued my interest in having a
better understanding of his work. The time has now come to
see whether our examination of his theory has helped us to
a better understanding of legal doctrine. Doctrinal theories
can take many forms. They can be formulated over a period
of decades rather than originated by a single person. I am,
however, interested in one type of theory in particular.
Therefore in the first subsection (IV.B.1), I will take
Langdell’s theory as a sample and describe the kind of
theory in which I am interested. Then, in the second
subsection (IV.B.2), I will address the question of how such
a theory should be evaluated, asking what are the
characteristics of a good doctrinal theory? What do good
doctrinal theories add to the legal enterprise?
1. The Nature of Doctrinal Theories. We generally think
of legal doctrine as a collection of rules that synthesize
judicial decisions in a given area. The discussion of Langdell
indicates, however, that it is wrong to think of doctrine
primarily in terms of rules. One does not create doctrine by
inventing new rules or by making old rules more specific.
Rather, the point of doctrine is to provide a context within
which existing rules will operate more smoothly and
determinately. It does this by making an abductive
inference. Langdell formulates a hypothesis about contract
formation and then the question becomes whether it will
form the basis for correct inferences about case outcomes.
Thus, he redescribes the making of a contract by
198. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962); HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981); W.V. Quine, Main
Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20
(1951).
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introducing two new technical terms—offer and acceptance.
This makes it easier to apply the principle of mutuality
because the analytical framework that Langdell has
supplied allows us to separate out two issues:
 Contract Formation—which requires an offer and
acceptance but not mutuality; and
 The Requirement of Consideration—which enforces
the mutuality principle.
The result is that the principle of mutuality which has
been the touchstone for one hundred years of contract law,
receives a new formulation—one that is more precise and
more determinate.
With this understanding of Langdell’s theory, we can be
more specific about a particularly important form of
doctrinal theory. I will call this an abductive theory after
the mode of reasoning it employs. There are, I think, two
main points to be made about this kind of theory. The first
is that the aim of the theory is to make existing legal
doctrine more determinate. The way in which it
accomplishes this is by providing a descriptive hypothesis
that will entail a particular result for those cases that it
covers. The second is that the theory is primarily
descriptive. It does not include new legal rules except to the
extent that existing legal principles are modified in order to
be described within the new legal context. If we take, for
example, one of Langdell’s rules—a binding contract
requires both an offer and an acceptance—we can see that
this is not a new normative proposal. Instead, it simply
restates the traditional rule—contracts require mutual
promises—in the context of the new theory.
With this description in mind, we can understand why
Langdell’s theory is so often mistaken for a deductive logical
system.199 A deductive system begins with axioms that may
or may not be true in the real world. A statement will then

199. I am avoiding the customary reference to geometry because the notion of
geometry is ambiguous. On the one hand, Euclidean geometry uses axioms that
describe the real world and therefore its theorems do so as well. On the other
hand, there are alternative geometries whose axioms may not accurately reflect
our intuitions about space.
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be considered “true in the system” if it meets one of two
alternate requirements:
1. It is itself an axiom in the system; or
2. It is deducible from an axiom in the system.
This technique shares two characteristics with an
abductive theory such as Langdell’s. First, the theory
receives much of its content from the precise definition of
terms; and, second, there is a deductive relationship
between the general statements of the theory and its
description of particular phenomena. Note, however, that
these two properties are also shared by Newtonian Physics
and other empirical theories, which are also based on
abductive reasoning.200 There is, however, an important
difference between deductive systems and abductive
theories. Deductive theories can specify that something is
true only within its own logical system. Abductive theories,
on the other hand, tell us something about the real world.
They are, in short, accountable for their consequences. In
the case of an empirical theory, it must be discarded if it
predicts false consequences. In the case of a doctrinal
theory, it must be rejected if it provides legal outcomes that
are unacceptable to our intuitions of justice and fairness.
I am obviously using the term “doctrinal theory” in a
somewhat specialized sense, and it might therefore be
helpful to give some examples. One that springs to mind is
the Learned Hand formula which redescribes negligence
liability in terms of the relative costs of precaution and
risk.201 The Learned Hand formula is based on the following
hypothesis: the reasonable person will take precautions
whenever they cost less than the amount of harm caused by
the accident discounted by the probability of its
occurrence.202 The concept of a reasonable person has been
the touchstone of negligence liability for over a century;
200. The point of an empirical theory is to provide a general description of
phenomena in terms that are not immediately observable in the phenomena
themselves. This often requires a new vocabulary that is precisely defined. The
test of an empirical theory is that it predicts events in the real world, unlike
doctrinal theories that entail normative prescriptions of case outcomes.
201. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
202. Id.
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and, by redescribing this concept, Hand’s formula makes it
more determinate. Indeed, if we assume that burdens,
probabilities, and harms could be precisely calculated, the
Learned Hand formula would yield a determinate result in
every case. This possibility, however, is more theoretical
than real. The test is useful in some cases, but not all.203
Where it is useful, however, it is very useful—it gives the
jury a way to think about the negligence determination.
2. Evaluating Doctrinal Theories. The question of
evaluation is crucial for abductive, doctrinal theories. Such
theories do not rest on the judicial authority of courts.
Rather they become important only because people opt to
use them. Obviously, this includes the courts. Indeed a
doctrinal theory that is taken up by the courts becomes law
itself. In addition, as Langdell’s experience demonstrates, a
doctrinal theory has a heuristic function that can be used
for teaching, even if the theory has not previously been
utilized by the courts. In thinking about law, each of us
decides how much reliance we will place upon available
theories, and therefore it is important to have an answer to
the question: What makes a good doctrinal theory? Under
what circumstances, is one justified in using the theory to
structure one’s own knowledge of law?
The first requirement for a doctrinal theory is already
obvious from the discussion in the last section. A doctrinal
theory should not do violence to our intuitions about the
right results in individual cases. Accepting a doctrinal
theory that produces a radical change in our patterns of
legal decision making is the worst kind of formalism. It
substitutes logical elegance for the legitimate concerns of
the legal system and those who enter it seeking justice. No
matter how persuasive a theory may be, the theory by itself
is a poor reason for radical change. Furthermore, a teacher
who uses such a theory will surely confuse students and
give them an unrealistic understanding of the law.
Therefore, at the very least, a doctrinal theory should
comport with our intuitions about the decision of cases.
203. For example, in those cases where the defendant has had a lapse of
attention, it is difficult to estimate the cost of insuring that such lapses do not
occur. One could have, for example, a back-up system but, in most cases, that
would be too costly. On the other hand, if the precaution is simply that the
defendant should pay attention, this does not seem to be best analyzed in terms
of the cost of being attentive.
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In thinking about the requirements for a doctrinal
theory, it is useful to have an example. In torts, there has
been a controversy over the rules that define the
responsibility of land owners and occupiers to those who
entered on their property. The common law created three
categories with three separate levels of care as follows:204
Definition

Duty of Care

Trespassers

One who enters the
land without a
privilege to do so

No duty with a
few exceptions

Invitees

One who enters with
permission

Duty to repair or
warn of known
dangers

Licensees

One who enters to do
business with the
owner

Duty to inspect

This doctrine was meant to capture our intuitions about
responsibility in obvious ways. As time went on, the
doctrine became less and less reliable. The relationships
between a landowner and those who entered the land
became more complex and, at the same time, more subject
to variations. Furthermore, a rule that had permitted little
or no concern for trespassers had become riddled with
exceptions, as courts sorted through the vagaries of the
trespass situation. As a result, the Supreme Court of
California abolished the doctrine205 and several other states

204. For a fuller explanation of these categories and the corresponding levels
of responsibility, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329-43 (1965).
205. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing the
distinctions between trespassers, invitees, and licensees.)
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followed.206 The California court explained its action by
writing the following:
[I]t is apparent that the classifications of trespasser, licensee,
and invitee, the immunities from liability predicated upon
those classifications, and the exceptions to those immunities,
often do not reflect the major factors which should determine
whether immunity should be conferred upon the possessor of
land. Some of those factors, including the closeness of the
connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, the
moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of
insurance, bear little, if any, relationship to the classifications
of trespasser, licensee and invitee and the existing rules
207
conferring immunity.

The result is that, in California and in many other
states, the liability of a landowner is treated according to
general negligence principles with special consideration
paid to the above factors. Not every state, however, has
joined California in this regard. Some states have retained
the three way distinction for two main reasons. First, these
states value the predictability and certainty that attaches to
the common law rule; and, second, they are generally more
conservative in defining the responsibility to trespassers
and invitees.
This controversy, like the one Langdell faced, presents a
particular problem. It is necessary for courts to strike a
balance between justice in the individual case and the need
to formulate the law in transparent and predictable ways.
This balance cannot be fully achieved by rules alone. On the
one hand, some courts have retained the traditional rules.
They end up denying recovery in meritorious cases or
inventing exceptions and sub-rules that avoid that result.
Either way, it is a losing strategy. If they adopt the first, the
law loses legitimacy because of its apparent unfairness. If
they adopt the second, the rules become so riddled with
exceptions that they lose their predictive function,
undermining the rule of law. On the other hand, courts that
abolished the common law distinctions had a different
206. See, e.g., Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 1996); Mounsey
v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973).
207. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 567.
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problem. They were free to decide cases in intuitively
appropriate ways, but, at the same time, lost the
advantages of a predictable and clear legal rule. Thus, with
respect to this issue, courts are at an impasse. Neither the
addition of sub-rules nor the elimination of rigid categories
is an adequate strategy in the face of a situation where the
real world is far more complex than the legal analysis that
purports to describe it. It would take an abductive doctrinal
theory such as Langdell’s to resolve this impasse. What is
needed is a redescription of the area that mirrors the
complexity of real world variations, and can serve as a
context for the application of reformulated rules.
Understanding this function of doctrinal theories is
important to articulating criteria for their evaluation. As a
pragmatist, I believe that issues of evaluation and
justification must relate to the usefulness of a theory and
that this, in turn, requires us to be clear about our goals. I
have suggested that the goal of doctrinal theories should be
to improve legal decision making by formulating a more
complex analysis of legal phenomena. If I am right, then a
theory’s usefulness in this regard is an important criterion
for evaluating it.
CONCLUSION
The above description of Langdell’s work makes it
apparent that he made at least two contributions to
American law besides his well known contributions to legal
education. The first is that he articulated a doctrinal theory
of contract law that accounted for the difficulties of
contracting at a distance. Secondly, and more importantly,
he provided a model for doctrinal theories. By studying this
model, I believe we have shed some light on the notion of
legal doctrine. Legal doctrines do not fulfill their
synthesizing function simply by conjoining pre-existing
legal rules. Nor do they invent legal rules. Rather, they
redescribe a particular legal area in order to provide a
clearer context in which legal rules can operate. As a result,
there are two requirements for determining the value of a
doctrinal theory. The first is its ability to mirror intuitions
about the just resolution of legal cases. The second is its
ability to provide simplicity and clarity to a particular area
of law. Specifically, does it describe the landscape in such a
way that the use of a few rules will result in relatively
determinate outcomes. When these tests are applied, we can
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see that Langdell’s doctrine was a success because it met
these requirements.
There is also the larger question: what have we learned
about our own doctrinal theorizing? There is no doubt but
what this kind of analysis is a regular part of our legal
routine. Sometimes we make a list of rules; sometimes we
look for cases whose facts are like our own. Inevitably,
however, we do more. We try to construct a richer story that
will identify the details that justify a particular legal
treatment. We do this not because it is the only thing we
could do; nor because it is the thing that lawyers have
always done. We do it because, beginning with Langdell,
this is how lawyers are taught to think. With the
complexities of modern life, it is unlikely that we will ever
come up with a theory that is a neat and tidy as Langdell’s;
but, by our training and by the nature of things, we will
always be partial theorizers. This is the reality, but it is a
reality in search of a justification. We have seen that, in
Langdell’s case, the attempt to justify his theory encounters
some difficulties. Even so, the practice of doctrinal
theorizing has a certain amount of pragmatic efficiency. It
organizes cases in such a way that they form a more
coherent whole; and such coherence aids understanding and
communication. On the other hand, we should be careful not
to claim too much. A compelling doctrinal justification may
seem like it should be binding on all, but ultimately it must
stand or fall on the willingness of lawyers and especially
courts to accommodate its use.

